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1  Introduction 
During the summer of 2005, the Big Three U.S. automobile manufacturers offered a 
customer promotion that allowed the public to buy new cars under a program of  
discounted prices formerly offered only to employees. These “employee discount 
pricing” (EDP) promotions led to an almost unprecedented increase in sales: For GM, the 
first month of the promotion, June 2005, was the highest sales month since September 
1986. July 2005, the first month of Chrysler and Ford’s employee discount offers, was 
the highest sales month ever for Chrysler and the highest July sales month ever for Ford. 
In this paper, we will show that the sales increase following the introduction of the 
promotions cannot be explained by lower prices.  Instead our leading hypothesis is that 
the EDP promotions were powerful “price cues,” with customers relying on the 
promotions as a signal that prices were discounted.   
Although it has been previously documented that price cues—such as “Sale” claims and 
other price signals
1—can have large effects on sales, there are at least three things about 
price cues demonstrated by the EDP promotions that have not been shown before. First, 
the findings indicate that customers may be more sensitive to price signals than they are 
to actual prices.  Prior to the EDP promotions, the discounts customers obtained on many 
cars were already larger than the employee discount for that car. As a result, for these 
models customers paid higher prices under the employee discount promotion than they 
would have paid in the weeks just before.  Yet even for these models whose prices went 
up, sales also went up.  These sales increases occurred despite the price changes, not 
because of them.   
Second, the findings indicate that price signals are relevant even in markets in which 
customers engage in extensive price search. A study by J.D. Power (2006) found that 
prospective car customers spent 15-20 hours gathering information before buying a car. 
One reason for this is the widely known phenomenon that prices for new cars vary a lot, 
even for two identical cars at the same dealership. Many car customers are apprehensive 
about getting a good price when they negotiate with a dealer, and being well-informed 
can help (Zettelmeyer, Scott Morton, and Silva-Risso, 2006a and 2006b). Despite the 
high level of search for cars relative to other product categories, we find that customers 
respond to the price signal embodied in the EDP promotions. 
Third, the findings indicate that price signals are relevant even when customers are 
buying an expensive durable good. For an expensive purchase such as a car, there may be 
more to be gained by obtaining a good price than for less expensive goods. Not finding 
the lowest price for a consumer packaged good might cost a customer tens of cents. Not 
finding the lowest price for a car could cost a customer hundreds or thousands of dollars. 
While we might expect customers to rely on price signals in packaged goods markets, it 
is noteworthy that customers also respond to price signals in a market in which high 
dollar values are at stake, and—as noted above—where customers conduct extensive 
information search. 
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Together these three results imply that price signals may have a much larger effect and 
wider application than previously has been thought.  In particular, it appears that they do 
not require accompanying price reductions to be effective, and that they are effective 
even in markets for large durable items where customers engage in intensive price search. 
Although our empirical results will show that for some cars, sales increased even though 
prices increased, we are not suggesting that price cues are a “behavioral” phenomenon. 
Instead we will argue that price cues can be an equilibrium outcome of a signaling model 
in which buyers and sellers are both rationally optimizing. This claim may appear 
inconsistent with the evidence that prices increased on some models following the 
introduction of the EDP promotions.  However, previous work on price cues establishes 
that a price cue need not be true all of the time in order for customers to gain (on average) 
by responding to the signal. As long as the signal is true enough of the time, customers 
will find the signal informative and will respond, even if they know that the signal is 
sometimes misleading. The key to a “noisy” signal being an equilibrium outcome is that 
it is self-regulating: if firms use the signal too often then it loses its credibility and 
customers will stop responding.
2 In this case the credibility of the EDP promotions was 
enhanced both by the fact that none of these firms had previously used this cue; and by 
the obligation to sell at the employee prices—the EDP cue cannot be used by a firm 
charging prices above the employee price levels. As we discuss in Section 6.1, there is an 
existing literature investigating the credibility of noisy prices cues and the conditions 
under which it is rational for customers to rely upon them (Anderson and Simester, 
1998). 
In the next section we briefly describe retail automobile pricing and the employee 
discount pricing promotions. In section 3, we review the relevant literature. In section 4, 
we present the data and discuss the variables we use in the analysis. Section 5 establishes 
the main empirical result and performs several robustness checks. In section 6, we 
discuss whether the empirical results are evidence of consumers reacting to price cues or 
of an alternative explanation. We conclude in section 7.   
2  Automobile Pricing and the Employee Discount Pricing Promotions 
In this section, we describe some characteristics of retail automobile pricing in the U.S. 
which are relevant to understanding the employee discount pricing (EDP) promotions. 
We then describe the EDP promotions themselves. 
2.1  Automobile Pricing 
In the U.S. market, dealer franchise laws mandate that auto manufacturers and dealers be 
independent parties. Dealers buy cars from manufacturers at invoice prices that do not 
vary over units or across dealers. Dealers are then free to set the retail prices at which 
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they sell cars to customers.
3 Almost all dealers negotiate prices individually with 
customers.
4 
Customers—knowing that they will be expected to negotiate with dealers—spend 
significant amounts of time gathering information before buying a car. If this information 
search revealed full price information to all customers, then there would be no scope for 
price cues. However, there are several characteristics of the industry that keep search 
activities from being fully revealing. First, the negotiated price that a customer will 
actually obtain for the specific vehicle he or she wants from a dealer in his or her area 
depends on factors that can only be learned by actually engaging in the negotiation, such 
as the dealer’s current inventory or the buyer’s patience in the negotiating process.  
Second, the final price for the car—meaning the total wealth outlay on the customer’s 
part—depends on several components; the negotiated price is one, but so is the amount 
the customer receives for his or her trade-in and the value of manufacturer rebates. Third, 
the final price of a car changes over time, particularly because of changes in 
manufacturer rebates.  These rebates, which can be worth thousands of dollars, are 
offered at the discretion of the manufacturers, making it difficult for customers to know 
whether they are better off purchasing now or in the future.
5 
Because of these characteristics, it is hard for customers to answer two important 
questions that are relevant to the purchase decision. First, what is the total amount the 
customer would have to pay for a car if he or she bought now? Second, is this an 
attractive price relative to the option of delaying and waiting for future discounts?  
2.2  The Employee Discount Pricing Promotions 
General Motors introduced the first employee discount pricing (EDP) promotion in June 
2005 and it was matched approximately a month later by both the Ford Motor Company 
and Chrysler.
6 As described above, manufacturers do not directly set retail prices. 
Consequently, the EDP promotions were implemented as an opt-in rebate program. 
Dealers who chose to participate could sell cars for no more than the employee discount 
price. A per car rebate from the manufacturer to the dealer compensated dealers for 
accepting lower prices. 
                                                 
3 For a description of how the EDP promotions operated in this environment, see the next subsection. 
4 There are some exceptions. These “no-haggle” dealerships will play a role in our later analysis. 
5 These features of the industry are to some extent choices of the manufacturer and/or dealer. A recent 
literature on price obfuscation (described in section 3.3) investigates the effects of such tactics. 
6 Each manufacturer had its own name for what were very similar plans; we refer to all three plans as 
“employee discount pricing,” or EDP.  GM’s plan was called “Employee Discount for Everyone,” Ford’s 
plan was called the “Ford Family Plan,” and Chrysler’s plan was called “Employee Pricing Plus.” 
8 Other documented examples of price signals include pricing-matching guarantees (Jain and Srivastava 
2000) and 9-digit price endings (Schindler and Kibarian 1996).  The research on price endings includes a 
field-experiment conducted in a mail-order catalog in which randomly selected customers received 
different versions of a catalog (Anderson and Simester 2003a).  When prices were raised by $10 (e.g. from 
$34 to $44) so that the price ending remained unchanged there was essentially no change in demand.  This 
lack of price sensitivity was interpreted as evidence that customers have relatively little price knowledge 
for these items, and so they find it difficult to distinguish whether a price offers good value.  However,   Page 4 
In the introduction we suggested that car customers may have responded to the EDP 
promotion as a “cue” that car prices were temporarily discounted. There are several 
features of the EDP promotions that may have contributed to their credibility as a signal 
of lower prices. First, an employee discount is a perquisite that many companies offer 
their employees, and many customers are used to the notion that employees of retail or 
manufacturing firms get discounted prices. Second, during the summer of 2005, 
inventory levels for the Big Three manufacturers were high, and publicly known to be 
high. There was also widespread discussion at the time that both GM and Ford were 
having financial difficulties.  For example, on May 5, 2005 Standard & Poor’s had 
lowered the corporate credit ratings for both GM and Ford to non-investment (junk) 
grade (Businessweek.com, 2005).   Excessive inventory levels and financial difficulties 
are both factors that might plausibly lead a company to offer temporary price discounts. 
Finally, the “employee discounts for everyone” was a novel promotion in the automobile 
industry, which means that customers did not have any prior experience in evaluating 
such a promotion, and no reason to dismiss it as routine. 
Market research undertaken by Ford during the EDP promotions suggests that customers 
did indeed interpret the employee discount promotion to mean that current prices were a 
very good deal relative to past or future opportunities. When customers were asked what 
the most important reason for purchasing a vehicle under Employee Pricing was, the most 
frequently cited reason was that Employee Pricing was the “best pricing ever available to 
a customer.” 
3  Literature review 
Our paper is related to previous work on both price search, price signaling and price 
obfuscation.   
3.1  Price Signaling 
The signaling literature traces its origins to the work of Spence in the 1970’s, and now 
includes a broad array of applications.  Within the consumer setting, most signaling 
models focus on unobserved quality signals.  However, there is also a well-established 
literature describing how customers use signals to infer price information.   
One of the first papers recognizing that customers may rely on signals as a substitute for 
price search was Bagwell (1987).  In Bagwell’s model, customers cannot observe a firm’s 
second period price without incurring a search cost.  However, because the firm’s costs 
are correlated over time, customers can use the first period price as a signal of future 
prices.  Simester (1995) extends this intuition by recognizing that if a firm’s costs are 
correlated across products then customers can use the prices of advertised products to 
infer the prices of unadvertised products.  He tests this theory by showing that the price 
that dry-cleaning stores charge to clean men’s shirts is an informative signal of the prices 
that the stores charge to clean suits and sweaters.  Similar logic can be used to explain 
why supermarkets may take a loss on the prices of items for which customers have good 
price knowledge, such as soda and milk.  If these prices provide a signal of the relative 
prices of other products for which customers have less price knowledge (e.g. baking 
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powder), then we might expect a negative cross-price elasticity between soda and baking 
powder. 
Perhaps the most straightforward of pricing cues is the “Sale” sign.  There is considerable 
evidence, including several experiments conducted in the field, confirming that placing a 
sale sign on an item without changing the price can significantly increase demand (see for 
example Inman, McAlister and Hoyer 1990).  The effectiveness of this simple cue is 
surprising; sale signs are inexpensive to use and retailers generally make few 
commitments when using them.  As a result, they can be placed on any products and as 
many products as stores prefer. Anderson and Simester (1998 and 2001) offer a signaling 
explanation for the effectiveness of sale signs by arguing that they inform customers 
about which products have been discounted, thus helping customers decide whether to 
visit another store or wait in anticipation of future discounts.  In their model the signal is 
self-fulfilling: if customers believe that products with sale signs are more likely to be 
discounted then firms prefer to place sale signs on their discounted products.  They also 
demonstrate that sale signs are self-regulating as the signal becomes less credible the 
more often it is used.  They validate this prediction using data from women’s apparel and 
consumer packaged goods markets.
8   
Price signaling theories all depend upon the claim that customers often do not have good 
price knowledge.  As support for this claim, researchers often cite a series of studies 
investigating customers’ price knowledge for grocery products.  Most of these studies 
reveal that no more than half of customers questioned can recall the prices of recently 
purchased products (see for example: Dickson and Sawyer, 1990).  In a recent review of 
the price signaling literature, Anderson and Simester (2003b) list five product 
characteristics that describe markets in which customers will often lack price knowledge.  
They include: (1) markets in which customers purchase infrequently; (2) markets in 
which product designs vary frequently; (3) markets in which prices vary frequently; (4) 
markets in which quality and/or sizes vary across firms; and (5) markets with a high 
proportion of new customers.  The first four of these characteristics clearly fit the 
automobile market.   
3.2  Price Search 
The search literature is older and even more extensive than the literature on signaling.  
This includes an extensive theoretical literature describing how search costs affect firm 
entry, product variety, prices and price dispersion.  Much of the modern literature on the 
relationship between pricing and search costs has its origins in Diamond (1971), which 
identifies what has come to be called the Diamond Paradox.  Given any number of firms 
and any positive search costs the unique equilibrium has all firms setting prices at their 
monopoly level, and so anticipating this outcome, customers in equilibrium do not 
search.  This is the opposite extreme of the Bertrand equilibrium, where in the presence 
of zero search costs and perfectly informed customers, firms compete prices down to 
marginal cost.  The Diamond result has prompted a series of papers that explore the limits 
of the argument, including what happens when products are not homogenous.   The 
results depend upon heterogeneity in customers’ tastes, but under reasonable assumptions 
we return to the standard outcome in which prices decrease with the number of   Page 6 
competitors and rise with search costs (see for example Anderson and Renault 1999, who 
cite earlier work by Wolinsky 1986; and Perloff and Salop 1985). 
The more recent empirical work on price search has focused on the role of the Internet.  
These studies investigate whether lower search costs on the Internet result in customers 
engaging in more search, and whether this impacts firms’ pricing strategies.  For 
example, using a sample of over 8,500 price observations, Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) 
compare the prices of books and CDs at Internet and conventional retailers.  They find 
that Internet retailers tend to charge lower prices and they make smaller adjustments to 
their prices.  Brown and Goolsbee (2002) study how increases in Internet use have 
affected the change in the prices of life insurance.  They conclude that prices have 
dropped by 8-15 percent, which they attribute to the Internet’s role in reducing 
customers’ search costs. 
3.3  Price Obfuscation 
The recent literature on price obfuscation suggests that customers’ lack of full price 
information may be in part attributable to the actions of the firms.  The role that firms can 
play in hindering customers’ ability to search for price information is investigated by 
Ellison and Ellison (2004).
9  They argue that price obfuscation can mitigate price 
competition by reducing the perceived substitutability of the alternatives, and present 
evidence from the Internet suggesting that obfuscation may sharply increase margins on 
computer memory modules.  They describe a variety of practices that firms use to 
obfuscate the price, including: introducing shipping costs and other price components; 
varying warranties, re-stocking fees and other contractual terms; varying prices and 
products across distribution channels; and/or using “add-on” pricing in which the base 
product has inefficiently low quality. 
Recall that we have identified several factors that make it difficult for customers to search 
for price information in the market for new automobiles.  These include the need to 
negotiate prices (in the absence of posted prices); the role of multiple price components 
(including trade-in value and manufacturer rebates); and considerable variation in both 
prices and products over time.  In principle, all of these characteristics of the automobile 
market result from endogenous decisions by the firms.  This suggests that the ability to 
obfuscate price information allows firms to control the effectiveness of customers’ price 
search and therefore the effectiveness of price signals.   
3.4  Search and Promotions in the Market for New Automobiles 
A series of studies have documented that consumers spend considerable time searching 
for information when purchasing a new automobile.  Ratchford and Srinivasan (1993) 
report that the average customer in their sample spent 12.6 hours searching for price 
information.  When combining the search for price and model information, this average 
increases to over 21 hours and includes 4.6 dealer visits.  Similar findings are reported by 
Bayus (1991) using a separate sample of replacement buyers of new automobiles.  
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In a longitudinal studying comparing survey data from 1990 and 2000 Ratchford, Lee and 
Talukdar (2003) show that the Internet has led to a slight reduction in this level of search, 
with the total time spent searching falling from 18.6 hours in 1990 to 15.6 hours in 2000.  
They also report drops in the number of models and number of dealers considered.  While 
customers may be spending less time searching, it is clear that many customers now use 
the Internet as their primary tool to obtain pricing information.  J.D. Power reported that 
in 1999 40% of new automobile buyers used the Internet during their purchasing process.  
This increased to 54% in 2000; and 67% in 2006 (J.D. Power, 2000 and 2006).  
Similarly, Zettelmeyer, Scott Morton and Silva-Risso (2006) report that 72% of their 
survey respondents used the Internet to help shop for a new vehicle. 
While most consumers now use the Internet, it appears that the Internet is not eliminating 
the price discovery process at dealerships; customers who use Internet referral services 
are only slightly less likely to report that their vehicle negotiations involved a long-series 
of offers and counter-offers (J. D. Power, 2000).  
We know of two studies that directly analyze manufacturer promotions for new cars. 
Thompson and Noordewier (1992) analyze the sales effect of newly introduced end-of-
model year incentives offered by domestic auto manufacturers in 1985. They find that 
these incentives were very effective during the end of the model cycle in 1985, somewhat 
less effective in 1986, and largely ineffective during 1987, suggesting that the incentives 
became less effective over time. Busse, Silva-Risso, and Zettelmeyer (2006) estimate the 
pass-through of auto manufacturer promotions from 1998 to 2000. They find that 
promotional payments to customers lower transaction prices significantly more than 
promotional payments to dealers. The authors attribute the difference in pass-through to 
the fact that consumers are typically not aware of dealer incentives but are aware of 
consumer incentives.  
4  Data  
The analysis conducted in this paper was done in collaboration with a major car 
manufacturer who allowed us to use data they had purchased from a supplier of 
transaction level data in the automotive industry (which we will call DATA in this 
paper). DATA collects transaction data from a 25% sample of dealers, designed to be 
representative of national sales, in the major metropolitan areas in the US. Transactions 
are uploaded to DATA nightly from internal dealer accounting systems and cover all new 
car transactions at the sampled dealerships.
11 As we will describe later, we will use a total 
of 8 weeks of data during the period May-July 2005, for a total of 290,910 observations. 
For each transaction we observe the exact vehicle purchased (nameplate, model, model 
year, trim level, body type, number of doors, engine, etc.). We also observe the price paid 
for the car, the dealer's cost of obtaining the car from the manufacturer, demographic 
information on the customer, detailed information on the trade-in vehicle if the customer 
used a trade-in, and the profitability of the car to the dealership. The data also contain 
census-based demographic information about buyers.  
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We will also use data on monthly sales and advertising expenditures for the Big 3 U.S. 
auto manufacturers for 2004 and 2005.  These were was obtained from company press 
releases (which are available on the respective company websites). 
To identify the employee discount promotions offered by GM, Ford, and Chrysler, we 
also obtained from a car manufacturer copies of the actual incentive announcements sent 
to dealers by all three domestic manufacturers. These announcements identify which cars 
the incentives apply to, when they start and when they are scheduled to end.  
4.1  Dependent Variables 
In our primary empirical results, we will analyze how prices and sales differ across cars 
and time periods. For the analysis of prices we will use a dependent variable in the 
estimation that is based on transaction prices. The price observed in the dataset is the pre-
sales tax price that the customer pays for the vehicle, including factory installed 
accessories and options, and including any dealer-installed accessories contracted for at 
the time of sale that contribute to the resale value of the car.
12 We will generally specify 
the regression equation using the natural log of prices; this allows us to measure the 
estimated effect of factors like demographics as a percentage effect on the price of a new 
car, rather than a dollar effect. 
Conceptually, we would like our price variable to measure the customer's total wealth 
outlay, which we will refer to as the “final price,” for the car. In order to compute the 
final price, we make two modifications to the observed transaction price. First, we 
subtract off the customer cash rebate amount if the car is purchased under a customer 
cash rebate since the manufacturer pays that amount on the customer's behalf. Second, we 
add to the purchase price any loss the customer made on his or her trade-in (or subtract 
from the purchase price any profit made on the trade-in). The estimated wholesale value 
of the vehicle (as booked by the dealer) minus the price the dealer pays for the trade-in 
vehicle is the Trade-In Buyer Loss. Dealers are willing to trade off profits made on the 
new vehicle transaction and profits made on the trade-in transaction, which is why the 
Trade-In Buyer Loss can be either positive or negative. When a customer loses money on 
the trade-in transaction, part of his or her payment for the new vehicle is made in kind 
with the trade-in vehicle. By adding the Trade-In Buyer Loss we adjust the negotiated 
(cash) price to include this payment. The final price is thus the contract price minus the 
customer cash rebate (if any) plus the trade-in buyer loss (if any). 
For the analysis of sales, we aggregate individual transactions to obtain measures of unit 
sales volume as our dependent variable. In particular, we will calculate sales on the level 
of manufacturers (e.g. GM, Ford, etc.) and at the level of a make-model-model year (e.g. 
2005 Honda Accord, 2006 Chevrolet Malibu). As needed, we will calculate sales over 
different time intervals.  
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4.2  The Employee Discount Programs 
General Motors was the first of three manufacturers to introduce an EDP.  The GM event 
was announced on June 3, 2005, and started on this date.  The initial announcement 
indicated that the program would only last until July 5, 2005.  On July 5 the program was 
extended through August 1, and was subsequently extended again until September 30.  
Most of our analysis of the effect of the GM promotion focuses on the change in sales 
and prices in the fortnights before and after the initial announcement on June 3. 
Ford introduced its “Ford Family Plan” on July 5, the same day that the GM plan was 
initially scheduled to end, while Chrysler introduced its plan on July 6.  Both firms 
initially announced that their plans would only last until August 1.  However, like GM 
they subsequently extended their programs into September. Our analysis of the effects of 
these two promotions will focus on fortnights before and after July 5/6. 
4.3  Controls 
We analyze the effects of the EDP promotions on prices using hedonic price regressions. 
In the regressions, we control for car fixed effects, which allow us to compare only 
identical products to each other.  We define a “car” as a unique combination of make, 
model, model year, body type, transmission, displacement, number of doors, number of 
cylinders, and trim level (for example, one “car” is a 2002 Honda Accord sedan with 
automatic transmission, a 2.2 liter engine, 4 doors, 4 cylinders, and the EX trim). We 
have 4,565 thus-defined cars in our sample. 
The only characteristics not captured by the fixed effects are factory- and dealer-installed 
options which vary within trim level. The transaction price we observe covers such 
options but we do not observe what options the car actually has. In order to control for 
price differences attributable to options, we include as an explanatory variable the 
dealer's cost of purchasing the vehicle from the manufacturer. Our measure of cost also 
takes into account any variation in holdback and transportation charges.
13 The Vehicle 
Cost measure does not reflect the 5-6% of the MSRP that GM, Ford, and Chrysler paid to 
participating dealers in the period during the EDP promotions. Hence, our Vehicle Cost 
variable will be the same for identical cars, whether a car was sold prior to or during the 
EDP.  
To control for time variation in prices, we define a dummy variable Weekend which 
specifies whether the car was purchased on a Saturday or Sunday to control for price 
differences within a week. If there are volume targets or sales on weekends, we will pick 
them up with these variables. We also control for the number of months between a car's 
introduction and when it was sold. This acts as a proxy for how new a car design is and 
also for the dealer's opportunity cost of not selling the car. Based on the distribution of 
sales after car introductions, we distinguish between sales in the first four months, 
months 5-13, and month 14 and later and assign a dummy variable to each category.  
                                                 
13 “Holdback” is the industry term for a percentage of the invoice price that is held by the manufacturer for 
a period and then rebated to the dealer. It serves the purpose of creating a small margin for the dealer even 
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We control for the region in which the car was sold. Our data lists 27 such regions (e.g. 
Baltimore/Washington, Chicago, Northern California, Southern California).  
We also control for a large number of census-based demographic characteristics at the 
level of the zip code. We merge these data from the 2000 census by the zip code of the 
buyer in the transaction data. Specifically, we control for the average race, education, 
occupation, income, household size, house value, house ownership, number of vehicles 
per household, commute time to work, unemployment, poverty status, and English 
proficiency of residents of the zip code in which the buyer resides.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the data. These summary statistics cover the 8 
weeks of data analyzed in this paper (two weeks before and two weeks after the GM EDP 
promotion start and the Ford/Chrysler EDP promotion start, respectively). 
5  Empirical Results 
In our empirical results we proceed in five steps. First, we examine the effect of the EDP 
promotions on manufacturer-level monthly unit sales. Then, we look at the effect of the 
promotions on transaction prices. Third, we look at the sales effect within the subset of 
cars whose prices increased at the advent of the EDP promotion. Fourth, we test for 
robustness. Finally, we decompose prices into their various components to determine 
whether we can interpret our findings as evidence of price cues. 
5.1  Manufacturer-level unit sales 
Figure 1 shows the change in monthly unit sales between 2004 and 2005 separately for 
the three manufacturers who used employee discount pricing promotions during the 
summer of 2005: GM, Ford, and Chrysler. The lighter bars show the months of the 
promotions, June-September for GM and July-September for Ford and Chrysler. 
As the top panel of Figure 1 shows, GM’s unit sales had been mostly down during 
January-May 2005 relative to the same months in 2004. However, during June 2005, unit 
sales were more than 40% higher than they had been during June 2004, and 20% higher 
during July 2005 relative to the previous July. As the next two panels show, neither Ford 
nor Chrysler showed a sales spike in June 2005 relative to 2004; Ford’s sales were down 
a few percentage points and Chrysler’s up a few percentage points relative to June 2004.  
Other major (non-domestic) manufacturers reported June 2005 sales within 15% of June 
2004 sales, suggesting that a sales increase of the size experienced by GM was specific to 
this manufacturer and not an industry-wide effect. 
When Ford and Chrysler initiated their own employee discount promotions in July 2005, 
both experienced sales effects similar to what GM experienced in the first month of its 
employee discount promotion: Ford’s unit sales were about 35% higher in July 2005 than 
in July 2004, and Chrysler’s sales just over 30% higher. 
Although all three manufacturers continued their promotions through September, the 
sales gains relative to 2004 were much smaller in August and September than they were 
in June and July; in some cases, sales were even down relative to 2004 in the later months 
of the promotion.  For Ford and GM the reduction in sales later in the year actually 
outweighed the sales increases associated with the EDP plans, so that annual unit sales 
were over 4% lower for both firms in 2005 compared to 2004.  Annual sales for the   Page 11 
industry were higher in 2005 than 2004, and so GM’s market share fell from 27.2% to 
25.9%, while Ford’s market share dropped from 18.0% to 17.0%.  Chrysler did not 
experience the same sales dip at the end of 2005 and so it reported an annual increase in 
unit sales of 4.4% and an increase in market share from 12.8% to 13.2%.  
Sales figures for the five other major manufacturers (Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Hyundai, 
and Volkswagen) do not show evidence that the EDP promotions had a business stealing 
effect. As Figure 1b shows, for all the manufacturers but Volkswagen, 2005 unit sales are 
an increase on 2004 sales for almost all of the months of 2005, and the EDP promotion 
months (June-September) do not stand out as either larger or smaller than during other 
months of the year. For Volkswagen, 2005 unit sales generally decrease relative to 2004, 
but June-September are actually smaller decreases relative to 2004 than the immediately 
preceding months. Furthermore, these sales figures do not appear to have been 
maintained during the EDP period through large competitive price cuts on the part of 
these five manufacturers. None of the five either decrease prices significantly or increase 
customer rebates during the GM EDP event. Only Hyundai and Nissan show any such 
change during the Ford and Chrysler EDP promotions, and the change is very modest—
an increase of $93 in the average rebate amount for Hyundai and of $145 in the average 
rebate amount for Nissan. 
We conclude from these initial manufacturer-level comparisons that the EDP programs 
led to large short-run increases in sales for all three domestic firms. However, these 
comparisons suggest that, at least for GM and Ford, much of this sales increase reflected 
temporal substitution, with customers shifting sales that might have occurred later in the 
year forward to the EDP periods.
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5.2  Price Effect 
We next investigate the effect of the EDP promotions on transaction prices. The EDP 
promotions certainly offered a price that was less than the manufacturer’s suggested retail 
price (MSRP). However, even in the time period before the EDP promotions, most 
customers would have paid a price below MSRP for their cars by negotiating a lower 
price from the dealer and by taking advantage of other kinds of promotions (such as cash-
back offers) that existed before the EDP went into effect.  
Many customers apparently interpreted the prices offered under the employee discount 
promotions as non-negotiable prices.
15 Thus, a customer who was a good negotiator 
might have gotten a price nearly as low as (or lower than) the EDP price even before the 
EDP took effect. Furthermore, if the EDP replaced other kinds of discounts that were 
nearly as large as (or larger than) the EDP discounts, then the actual effect of the EDP on 
                                                 
14 One possible additional explanation for the reduction in GM and Ford car sales later in the year is the 
landfall of Hurricane Katrina at the end of August of 2005. We do not think that Katrina contributed much 
to the sales slump since during September (when Katrina’s effects should have been most severe) as all 
major foreign manufacturers and Chrysler increased sales year over year.  
15 This was not, in fact, the case. Under the rules of the promotion set by the manufacturer, dealers who 
were participating in an EDP promotion were not allowed to sell cars above the EDP price, but they could 
sell cars below the EDP price.   Page 12 
transactions prices could be much smaller than the comparison between the MSRP and 
the employee discount price would suggest. 
We estimate the effect of the EDP promotions on transaction prices using a hedonic price 
regression approach.  We regress the natural log of the final price
16 paid by customer i for 
vehicle j at time t on a vector of customer demographics (Xit), a vector of time effects 
such as whether the car was purchased on the weekend and the age of the model (Xt), the 
cost to the dealer of acquiring the car from the manufacturer, regional dummy variables, 
and detailed car fixed effects which are the cross product of make, model, model year, 
body type, transmission, displacement, number of doors, number of cylinders, and trim 
level (φj).
17  
  ln(pijt) = α EDPt + β1 Xit + β2 Xt + β3 Vehicle Costijt + β4 Regionij + φj +εijt.  (1) 
EDPt is a time-varying indicator that is equal to 1 during the period that an EDP 
promotion is in effect.  The coefficient of interest is α, from which we can estimate the 
percentage change in the transaction price before and after the introduction of the EDP 
promotions. 
Because we would expect the impact of the EDP promotions to depend on whether a 
manufacturer was participating in the program, we interact EDPt with indicators for each 
of the Big 3 manufacturers (GM, Ford, and Chrysler). For example, define GMj = 1 if 
vehicle j is produced by GM. The hedonic regression specification we estimate is 
therefore: 
ln(pijt) =  αGM GMj ⋅ EDPt +αFord Fordj ⋅ EDPt + αChrysler Chryslerj ⋅ EDPt + 
   αO Othersj ⋅ EDPt + β1 Xit + β2 Xt + β3 Vehicle Costijt + β4 Regionij + φj +εijt.(1’) 
One might be concerned about the exogeneity of the EDP promotion indicator variable, 
especially if one believed that the automobile manufacturers decided to implement these 
promotions because transaction prices for cars were declining. In order to accommodate 
this, we use a regression discontinuity approach. Regression discontinuity has been used 
primarily in the program evaluation literature when researchers wish to evaluate the 
effect of a treatment, such as a policy intervention, on an outcome of interest when the 
application of the treatment is correlated with the outcome of interest. One example 
would be the effect of remedial education on academic performance where the students 
who are offered remedial education are those who are already performing poorly. 
Regression discontinuity takes advantage of the fact that there are often discontinuities in 
the application of the treatment—for example, subjects who fall just to one side or just to 
the other side of a cutoff. If one looks in a narrow window around the cutoff, one can 
consider assignment to the treatment or control group within that window to be 
essentially random. For example, if a scholarship is available to students with SAT scores 
of 1400 and above, then one could consider students who got an SAT score of 1400 and 
received a scholarship and students who got SAT scores of 1390 and did not receive a 
                                                 
16 The “final price” is the transaction price minus any customer rebate plus the trade-in buyer loss, as 
described in section 4.1.  
17 Section 4 contains a more detailed description of these variables.   Page 13 
scholarship to be essentially randomly assigned to the treatment and control group—the 
students in the two groups are presumably indistinguishable in their underlying academic 
ability. The key identifying condition is that there be no unobservable characteristics that 
are relevant to the outcome of interest that change discontinuously at the same point as 
the treatment discontinuity (Hahn et al. 2001; Imbens and Angrist 1994). 
In the case of EDP promotions, we use data on transactions that occurred just before the 
promotion took effect as the “control” observations and data on transactions that occurred 
at the beginning of the promotion as “treatment” observations. The argument for doing 
this is that demand conditions change gradually over time; certainly the data that filters 
up to the manufacturers from the dealer network would reveal changes in demand 
gradually. Thus, the precise date that is chosen as the start of the promotion will be 
essentially random within a period of evolving demand. Furthermore, there is a time lag 
of several weeks to several months between the vintage of the data that a manufacturer 
uses to plan a promotion and when the promotion actually takes effect. (See Busse, Silva-
Risso, and Zettelmeyer (2006) which uses regression discontinuity to estimate the price 
effects of promotions.)  
In the price regressions, we use two Saturday-to-Friday calendar weeks of data before the 
promotion starts, and two such weeks of data at the beginning of the promotion, leaving 
out the Saturday-to-Friday week that contains the promotion start date itself. For the GM 
EDP promotion, which started on Friday, June 3, 2005, we use transactions that occurred 
from Saturday, May 14, 2005 through Friday, May 27, 2005 as the pre-test (control) data, 
and transactions that occurred from Saturday, June 4, 2005 through Friday, June 17, 2005 
as the post-test (treatment) data. 
We estimate a separate specification for the GM promotion, which started on June 3, 
2005, and the Ford and Chrysler promotions, which started on July 5 and 6, 2005, 
respectively.  
The results for the estimates of equation (1’) using data from the two fortnights 
surrounding the GM promotion start date are reported in column 1 of Table 2; the 
estimates using data surrounding the Ford/Chrysler promotion start dates are reported in 
column 2. The demographics have the expected sign in most cases. In both columns, 
there is a positive and statistically significant effect on price for customers who are 
female, who are older, and who are from neighborhoods with a higher percentage of 
black residents, a higher percentage of residents with less than a high school education, 
larger average household size, and more vacant housing. There is a negative and 
statistically significant effect for customers from neighborhoods with a higher percentage 
of Asian residents, with higher average house values, and with more vehicles per 
household. Most of the occupation indicators are not statistically significant, and are 
unreported. Cars sell for higher prices on the weekend. The time since the model’s 
introduction has a negative (but not consistently statistically significant) effect on prices.  
The coefficients of primary interest are the price effects of the promotion, estimated by 
the α coefficients on the EDP promotion indicator and its interaction with the 
manufacturer dummies. In the results for the GM EDP promotion, reported in column 1, 
the EDP coefficient indicates that, for the non-Big 3 manufacturers, ln(price) was not 
significantly different in the initial weeks of the promotion from what it had been in the   Page 14 
weeks just preceding the promotion. However, the coefficient of 0.0129 on the GMj⋅EDPt 
variable indicates that GM’s prices were higher by approximately 1.3% during the 
promotion than they had been before the promotion. During this same period, namely the 
weeks around the start of the GM EDP promotion, Ford’s prices fell by 0.9%, and 
Chrysler’s prices increased by 0.8%.   
The analogous estimates for the time window around the start of the Ford and Chrysler 
promotions are reported in column 2.  The non-Big 3 manufacturers’ prices decreased by 
0.1% during this period.  Chrysler’s prices increased by an estimated 2.5%, and Ford’s 
prices fell by 0.2%. During this same time period GM’s prices increased by 0.3% 
(statistically significant at the 1% level). The implication is that final prices did not fall 
on average at the inception of the EDP promotion. Indeed, prices for GM and Chrysler 
rose.    
Because of the differences in promotions that were available prior to the EDP, including 
very large cash-back offers for some cars, this average effect for each manufacturer may 
mask considerable heterogeneity between models in the effect of the EDP on prices.  To 
investigate this heterogeneity, we can estimate the effect of the employee discount 
promotion separately for each model. We do so by interacting make-model-model year 
dummies with the employee discount promotion indicator.  We will refer to the make-
model-model year dummies as “model” dummies to distinguish them from the more 
granular “car” dummies described in section 4 and labeled φ in equation 1. The 
regression equation, which differs from equation 1 only in the first term on the right hand 
side of the equation, is: 
  ln(pijt) = αj µj ⋅ EDPt + β1 Xit + β2 Xt + β3 VehicleCostijt + β4 Regionij + φj +εijt.  (2) 
where µj represents the “model” dummies. In this specification, we also use a regression 
discontinuity approach, which means that we estimate one specification for the window 
around the GM promotion start date, and a separate specification for the window around 
the Ford and Chrysler start dates. 
Table 3 summarizes the coefficients on µj ⋅ EDPijt (the “model”-promotion interaction 
terms) for the GM specification. These coefficients estimate the increase in ln(price) for 
each model at the advent of the EDP promotion. Of all 369 interaction term coefficients, 
54.5% are positive—implying that the start of the EDP promotion was associated with a 
price increase for that model, and 15.4% are positive and statistically significant. Looking 
within GM cars, 73.9% of the terms are positive, and 38.6% of the terms are positive and 
statistically significant. These are substantially higher proportions of estimated price 
increases than for Chrysler, Ford, or for non-domestic manufacturers (none of which 
were offering EDP promotions during this time period). For these sets of models, the 
fractions of estimated price changes that are positive and statistically significant are 
15.2%, 11.1%, and 6.4% respectively. 
This evidence indicates that for GM cars, transaction prices for the majority of cars were 
higher in the two weeks at the beginning of the EDP promotion than they had been in the 
two weeks just prior to the start of the EDP promotion. Indeed, the EDP promotion 
coincided with a statistically significant decrease in price for only 9% of GM’s 88 
models.    Page 15 
These results do not support the hypothesis that the price increases observed for GM are 
simply an industry trend of increasing prices that happened to occur at the same time as 
GM implemented the employee discount pricing promotion. A Gaussian test of equality 
between the fraction of positive and significant interaction terms for GM (38.6%) and for 
the rest of the manufacturers excluding GM (8.2%) rejects equality at the 1% level (z = 
6.90).  
Table 4 reports the analogous results to Table 3, but this time using data from the time 
period surrounding the start of the Ford and Chrysler employee discount pricing 
promotions. In these data, 23.4% of the “model”-promotion interaction terms are positive 
and statistically significant for Ford models, and 67.7% for Chrysler models. This 
compares to 13.8% for GM models in the same period, and 5.9% for non-domestic 
models. The fraction for the entire set of cars excluding Ford and Chrysler models is 
8.4%. A test of the equality between the fraction of positive and significant interaction 
terms for Ford vs. the non-Ford/non-Chrysler cars (23.4% vs. 8.4%) rejects equality at 
the 5% level of significance (z = 2.65), while a test of the Chrysler vs. non-Ford/non-
Chrysler sample (67.7% vs. 8.4%) rejects equality at the 1% level (z = 8.74).
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5.3  Sales Response for Cars whose Prices Increased 
5.3.1  The GM EDP promotion 
As described in the introduction and section 5.1, sales during the employee discount 
promotion periods (June and July 2005, especially) were record sales months for GM, 
                                                 
18 All of our price specifications control for consumer demographics, which raises the following issue for 
interpreting our results. If consumer demographics change with the EDP, it would be possible for the price 
of a model conditional on demographics to rise for all demographic groups, but for more "low price" 
demographic consumers to buy the model, so that average price paid in the market for that model declines. 
To investigate whether this is the case we do two things. First, in Section 6.4 we analyze whether the 
demographic characteristics of consumers before and during the EDP promotion differ (we find that there 
are some differences but they are small). Second, we re-estimate specifications (1’) and (2) without 
demographic variables (not reported). We find that the coefficients of interest in specification (1’) are very 
similar. Around the GM promotion start the average prices of GM cars increased by 1.1% (1.3% with 
demographics); for Ford they changed by -0.8% (-0.9% with demographics); for Chrysler they increased by 
0.8% (unchanged). Around the Ford/Chrysler promotion start the average prices of GM cars increased by 
0.4% (0.3% with demographics); for Ford they changed by -0.1% (-0.2% with demographics); for Chrysler 
they increased by 2.4% (2.5% with demographics).  
Repeating specification (2) without demographics shows that prices on individual models are somewhat 
more likely to be positive and significant. Around the GM promotion start, looking within GM cars, 44.2% 
of the “model”-promotion interaction terms are positive and statistically significant (38.6% with 
demographics). For Chrysler, Ford, and non-domestic manufacturers the fractions of estimated price 
changes that are positive and statistically significant are respectively 33% (15.2% with demographics), 19% 
(11.1% with demographics), and 9.3% (6.4% with demographics) respectively. Around the start of the Ford 
and Chrysler employee discount pricing promotions, 25.6% of the “model”-promotion interaction terms are 
positive and statistically significant for Ford models (23.4% with demographics), and 76% for Chrysler 
models (67.7% with demographics). This compares to 15.2% for GM models in the same period (13.8% 
with demographics), and 4.9% for non-domestic models (5.9% with demographics). In summary, even 
without demographic controls, cars sold by manufacturers who are starting an employee discount pricing 
promotion are more likely to exhibit price increases than cars sold by other manufacturers.     Page 16 
Ford, and Chrysler. These sales increases occurred despite the evidence in section 5.2 that 
prices actually increased for a majority of GM and Chrysler models, and for a substantial 
share of Ford models. In this section, we investigate whether sales went up for cars 
whose prices increased, or whether the overall sales increases were a result of sales 
increases for models whose prices went down overwhelming sales decreases for models 
whose prices increased. We will examine unit sales in the same pairs of pre-test and post-
test fortnights that we used in section 5.2 to estimate the change in prices around the 
EDP. We examine specifically the sales of the models that were identified in section 5.2 
to have significant increases in prices at the advent of the EDP promotion. 
We perform separate analyses for the GM and the Ford/Chrysler promotion periods. 
Table 5 reports the results. There are 34 GM models for which transaction prices are 
estimated to have increased by a statistically significant amount. Among these 34 models, 
26 models (76.5%) experience increased unit sales between the pre- and post-test periods.  
Because there is considerable variation in the sales volume of the different models, we 
recalculated this proportion when weighting the models by their sales during the two-
week “pre-promotion” period.  This amplified the effect; when weighting the models by 
pre-promotion period, we observed sales increases for 88.6% of the models for which 
there was a significant price increase. 
Moreover, this sales increase was specific to GM models.  Around the same time period 
(the start of the GM EDP promotion), 6 Chrysler models and 13 non-domestic models 
were estimated to have had statistically significant price increases. None of these 19 
models had an increase in unit sales over the same period. There were 5 Ford models 
with significant price increases, of which only one had a sales increase.  Overall, if we 
compare the fraction of GM models whose price increased for which sales increased at 
the same time, to the fraction of non-GM models whose price increased for which sales 
increased we find very different results. The fraction is 76.5% for GM vs. 4.2% for non-
GM models if we do not weight by pre-promotion sales, and 88.6% vs. 1.0% if we do 
weight by pre-promotion sales.  With or without the weighting, a t-test rejects at the 1% 
level that these proportions are equal in the GM and non-GM samples.   
Another way to look at these data is to test for each manufacturer whether sales increased 
between the pre- and post-promotion period. We do this using a non-parametric sign test, 
which tests whether increases in sales are statistically significantly more likely than 
decreases. Note that we are looking within the set of models whose prices have increased 
between the pre and post periods, which makes evidence of sales increases particularly 
noteworthy. Table 6 lists the six of the largest eight auto manufacturers that have any 
models with statistically significant estimated price increases at the time of the GM EDP 
promotion, and counts the number of those models that had sales increases during the 
same period. The one-sided test rejects that sales decreases are as likely as or more likely 
than sales increases for GM with a p-value of 0.001. For the other five manufacturers, the 
lowest p-value is 0.969.  
The sign test only counts the number of sales increases vs. sales decreases, without 
considering the size of the increases and decreases. For each of the models considered in 
the sign test above, we calculate the percentage increase or decrease in sales that model 
experienced, and then use a signed rank test to test whether increases were statistically 
significantly more likely than decreases, giving greater weight to large changes than   Page 17 
small changes. The results are reported in the last column of Table 5. The results show 
that we reject that sales decreases are as likely as or more likely than sales increases for 
GM models whose prices increase at the advent of GM’s EDP promotion with a p-value 
of 0.002, but the next lowest p-value among the other manufacturers is 0.841, again a 
stark contrast to GM. 
To summarize, what we have found is that around the start of GM’s employee discount 
pricing promotion, sales increased for most of the GM models for which prices increased, 
but sales did not increase for the vast majority of non-GM models for which prices 
increased at the same time. This evidence yields several conclusions. First, GM was not 
experiencing some industry-wide changes in market conditions that led to both increased 
prices and increased sales; almost no non-GM model that experienced a price increase 
experienced a sales increase at the same time, while almost all GM models for which 
prices increased also had increased sales.
19 Second, it appears that GM’s EDP promotion 
affected buyers’ purchasing decisions in a way that led them to be willing to increase 
their purchases of GM cars, despite price increases.  For other manufacturers, we see the 
more familiar result that price increases do not lead to sales increases. 
5.3.2  The Ford/Chrysler EDP promotion 
In the lower half of Table 5 we examine the change in sales for cars whose prices 
increased between the pre- and post-test periods around the start of the Ford and Chrysler 
EDP promotions. There are 19 Chrysler models for which prices increase during this time 
period, and for 52.6% of them, unit sales also increase (41.8% when weighted by pre-
promotion sales). For Ford, 11 models have price increases, of which 36.4% (50.0% 
when weighted) experience sales increases. This is a contrast both to GM, which has 12 
models with increased prices, none of which experience sales increases, and to the 12 
non-domestic models that have increased prices, 16.7% of which have increased sales 
(9.6% when weighted). If we test the fraction of models with increased prices which also 
have increased sales for Chrysler models vs. non-Ford/non-Chrysler models we reject 
equality at the 1% confidence level using either weighted or unweighted numbers. For 
testing Ford models vs. non-Ford/non-Chrysler models on the same criterion, we reject 
equality at the 5% level if we use unweighted numbers and at the 1% level if we use a 
sales-weighted measure. 
Table 6 reports sign and signed rank tests for the five manufacturers that had models with 
positive and significant price changes around the start of the Ford and Chrysler EDP 
promotions. For these manufacturers, we cannot reject that sales decreases were as likely 
as sales or more likely than increases for any of the manufacturers using either the sign or 
the signed rank test. This is the case even though, in the previous paragraph, we were 
able to conclude that the proportions of models that experience sales increases is 
different for Ford and Chrysler compared to the rest of the sample.  
                                                 
19 Although GM cars with increased prices also had increased sales, GM cars that did not experience price 
increases experienced a larger increase in sales, as one would expect. Of the 85 GM models that were 
covered by the EDP promotion, the 34 models for which price increased had increased sales of 24% on 
average. The 51 models that did not experience price increase had increased sales of 42% on average.   Page 18 
We suspect that part of the reason that we get a failure to reject for the Ford and Chrysler 
promotion period has to do with the timing of the promotion relative to quarterly sales 
incentives. Ford’s EDP promotion began on July 5, 2005, and Chrysler’s on July 6, 2005. 
The pre-test period for these promotions is June 18-July 1, 2005 and the post-test period 
is July 9-22, 2005, leaving out the Saturday-to-Friday week in which the start dates 
actually fall. In this case, the pre-test period includes the last few days of June, which are 
also the end of the second quarter. We know that dealers often face end of month sales 
quotas and bonuses, and may also have quarterly incentives. Examining the daily number 
of transactions industry-wide during this period (see Table 7), we see that the two highest 
sales days during the Ford/Chrysler pre- and post-test periods were the last and second to 
last days of June, 2005 with sales of 17,245 and 11,198 cars respectively. Because the 
pre-test period includes the end of a month, that may push up the pre-test sales, 
diminishing the difference between the pre and post periods. We address this issue in our 
next test. 
5.4  Controlling for Industry Trends 
One potential criticism of the results so far—which the month-end issue discussed in the 
previous paragraph highlighted—is whether the increase in sales in conjunction with the 
increase in prices at the time of the EDP is the result of an industry-wide factor that 
changed both price and sales, or that enabled sales to increase even as prices were 
increasing. One way to address this is to use a difference-in-differences style of analysis. 
In other words, we could look at the changes in sales for the three manufacturers of 
interest relative to the changes in sales that were happening at the same time for other 
manufacturers. In order to implement this, we start with the models for GM, Ford, and 
Chrysler whose prices are estimated to have increased in conjunction with the 
Ford/Chrysler EDP promotions. For each of those models, we construct the percentage 
change in sales for the vehicle segment of that model, leaving out that particular model.
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k Q  represents unit sales in the post-introduction period for model k in the same 
segment as model j, 
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a signed rank test using the differences between the percentage change in a model’s own 
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Table 8 reports the results of these tests. For the 19 Chrysler models whose prices are 
estimated to have increased during the Ford/Chrysler EDP period, 16 models experienced 
                                                 
20 Models are divided into 8 vehicle segments, such as Compact, Midsize, SUV, etc.   Page 19 
sales increases relative to the change in sales in their segment (compared to 10 that 
experienced absolute increases, as reported in Table 7). We can reject (with a p-value of 
0.012) that decreases are as likely as or more likely than increases. The results are similar 
for Ford. For the 11 Ford models whose prices are estimated to have increased during the 
Ford/Chrysler EDP period, all 11 models experienced sales increases relative to the 
change in sales in their segment (compared to only 4 that experienced absolute increases, 
as reported in Table 6). We reject that the probability of sales increases is equal to or 
greater than the probability of sales decreases for Ford with a p-value of 0.002. The 
results are essentially the opposite for GM. There were 12 GM models that are estimated 
to have price increases during the Ford/Chrysler EDP period. None of those models had 
increased sales relative to their segment. 
Table 9 reports the results of an analogous signed rank test, but using data around the GM 
promotion window. Since we concluded that GM models with increased prices had 
increased absolute sales (in Table 6) it is not surprising that we also conclude that these 
models had increased sales relative to their segments as well (p-value of 0.000). We also 
conclude that Ford and Chrysler models with increased prices did not experience relative 
sales increases (a failure to reject with p-values of 0.960 and 0.986, respectively). 
Notice that our control for the change in vehicle sales in the rest of the segment is 
conservative: we are averaging the changes in sales over all models, including models 
whose prices have decreased—and whose sales would therefore be expected to 
increase—and comparing them to the subset of models on EDP promotion that have price 
increases. Nevertheless, the subset of EDP models still have greater sales increases than 
the average increase in the segment, even though some of the non-EDP models had price 
decreases.  
Although the way we have made our difference-in-differences style calculation is 
conservative, it allows us to net out the average sales trend in the industry. However, one 
might also be interested in a more “apples-to-apples” comparison of cars that experience 
similar price increases, some of which are on an EDP promotion and some of which are 
not. This would allow us to draw conclusions about the effect of the EDP-induced price 
changes compared to price changes of a similar size which are not marketed as employee 
discount pricing. 
In Figures 2 and 3, we plot for each model the percentage change in price and the 
corresponding percentage change in quantity between the pre- and post-promotion 
periods.   Figure 2 shows changes for GM models separately from models produced by 
other manufacturers for the time period around the GM EDP promotion. Figure 3 shows 
Ford and Chrysler separately from other manufacturers for the time period around the 
Ford and Chrysler EDP promotions. The figures both use the raw data on price changes, 
and not the hedonic price coefficients that give the estimated price changes conditional 
on other covariates. 
As Figure 3 shows, GM models and other models are both well-represented in the price 
increase (above the horizontal axis) and price decrease (below the horizontal axis) 
regions. What is strikingly different about the two is the distribution of sales changes. 
Along any latitude line (representing a particular level of price change) there is a greater 
share of GM cars with sales increases than sales decreases, while the reverse is true for   Page 20 
models of other manufacturers. In some sense, the top left and bottom right quadrants of 
this figure are not unsurprising—these are the quadrants corresponding to a negative 
correlation between price changes and quantity changes. Moreover, it is not surprising 
that GM would be better represented in the bottom right quadrant (price decreases and 
quantity increases) and the other manufacturers in the top left (price increases and 
quantity decreases) because GM was running a promotion that promised lower prices. 
What is surprising is the other two quadrants: the top right, which shows that for a 
number of GM models, sales increase even though prices increase, although this is the 
case only for a handful of non-GM models, and the bottom left, which shows that for 
most non-GM models whose prices decrease, sales also decrease, perhaps indicating that 
GM’s EDP promotion was crowding out the sales increase that other models would have 
had in response to price decreases. 
Figure 3 shows that a similar phenomenon was in effect for Ford and Chrysler cars 
around the Ford/Chrysler EDP promotion. Again, holding a price change fixed, many 
more Ford and Chrysler models have sales increases than do non-Ford, non-Chrysler 
models. However, the data are less dense here than they are for the GM promotion. 
5.5  Robustness 
5.5.1  One-week windows 
We have argued that demand changes gradually enough in this industry that by restricting 
attention to two-week windows around the introduction of the EDP events it is unlikely 
that the sales changes we have reported can be explained by some abrupt, intervening 
change in demand.  This argument is strengthened by the evidence that the sales changes 
are specific to the firms that introduced the EDP programs and do not extend to other 
manufacturers.  However, to further test the robustness of our results we repeated the 
analysis using one-week (rather than two-week) data windows.  For the GM event, the 
pre-introduction week is May 21-27, 2005, and the post-introduction week is June 4-10, 
2005. For the Ford/Chrysler EDP, the pre-introduction week is June 25-July 1, 2005 and 
the post-introduction week is July 9-15, 2005. 
The results are very similar to what we find with the two-week windows. The fractions of 
GM, Ford, and Chrysler models that have positive and significant price increases 
(reported in Table 10 and Table 11) are within a few percentage points of the two-week 
window results (reported in Table 3 and Table 4).  
The sales change results for the one-week windows (reported in Table 12 and Table 13) 
are also very similar to those of the two-week windows (reported in Table 9 and Table 8). 
Starting with the GM event, Table 12 shows that of the 27 GM models with increased 
prices 20 had increased sales relative to their segment (p-value of 0.001 in the signed 
rank test). As expected, for the GM event we also conclude that Ford and Chrysler 
models with increased prices did not experience sales increases relative to their segment 
(a failure to reject in the signed rank test with p-values of 0.93 and 0.97, respectively). 
For the Ford/Chrysler EDP event, Table 13 shows that of the 15 Chrysler models whose 
prices are estimated to have increased, 13 models experienced sales increases relative to 
the change in sales in their segment. We can reject (with a p-value of 0.003 in the signed 
rank test) that sales decreases are as likely as or more likely than increases. The results   Page 21 
are similar for Ford. For the 12 Ford models whose prices are estimated to have increased 
during the Ford/Chrysler EDP period, 11 models experienced sales increases relative to 
the change in sales in their segment. We reject that sales decreases are as likely as or 
more likely than increases for Ford with a p-value of 0.002 in the signed rank test. The 
results are essentially the opposite for GM. There were 10 GM models that are estimated 
to have price increases during the Ford/Chrysler EDP period. None of those models had 
increased sales relative to their segment.  
In summary, our results are essentially unchanged if we consider a narrow one-week 
instead of a two-week window. This makes it more likely that our price and sales results 
are driven by the discontinuity created by the EDP promotion, and not by changes in 
demand conditions between the pre- and post-EDP introduction periods.  
5.5.2  Other times of the year 
As another robustness check, we replicate our procedure of finding cars with statistically 
significant price increases and then testing whether sales increase for those cars for other 
time periods than those surrounding the start of the EDP promotions. Specifically, we use 
data from various two-week “pre-test” periods and compare those data to data from 
matching two-week “post-test” periods, leaving out a week in between. We use 7 pre-test 
periods with start dates between March 4, 2005 and June 17, 2005 and 7 pre-test periods 
from the same time period of 2004. For none of the Big 3 manufacturers in any of these 
time periods could we reject that cars that experienced statistically significant price 
increases were at least as likely or more likely to experience sales decreases than sales 
increases. Only for the EDP period do we find this result. 
5.6  Components of Price 
The price measure we have used in our analysis to date corresponds to the customer's 
final price for the car. The final price in a new car purchase transaction depends on the 
outcome of two negotiations, one over the price of the new car, and one over the price 
that the dealer pays the customer for the trade-in. The price that the customer pays for the 
new car is the negotiated price that the dealer and customer agree upon (i.e., the contract 
price) minus any direct-to-customer manufacturer rebate. We can think of the 
manufacturer rebate as a portion of the contract price that the manufacturer pays on 
behalf of the customer, meaning it is not part of the customer’s final price for the car.  If 
the customer has a trade-in vehicle, this can either increase or decrease the customer’s 
final price for the car depending, respectively, on whether the customer negotiates a price 
that is less than or more than the actual value of the trade-in. Equation 4 describes this 
relationship: 
(Final price) = (Contract price) – (Rebate) + (Trade-in value) – (Trade-in price)  (4) 
  Net new vehicle price  Trade-in buyer loss 
We refer to the contract price minus the rebate as the “Net new vehicle price” and to the 
trade-in value minus the trade-in price as the “Trade-in buyer loss,” which can be either 
positive or negative.   Page 22 
We now investigate how the EDP promotions differentially affected each component of 
price to better understand the impact on customers’ final prices. We begin by analyzing 
how trade-in credits changed at the start of the EDP promotions.  
5.6.1  Trade-In Credits 
As described above, when a customer buys a new car using a trade-in, she must actually 
negotiate two prices: the price she will pay for the new car, and the price that the dealer 
will pay her for her old car. In these negotiations, the dealer is usually quite willing to 
trade off profits on the sale of the new car for profits on the trade-in transactions. In fact, 
it is well-known by industry insiders that a skillful salesperson will hone in on whichever 
transaction the customer is most preoccupied with (getting a good price on the new car or 
getting a good price for her trade-in), and offer a price that is advantageous to the 
customer on that dimension, holding out for a price that is advantageous to the dealer on 
the other. 
We propose that this is relevant to the price cue story because the EDP may have focused 
customers on the net new vehicle price, leading them to let their guard down in the 
negotiation on the trade-in price. Said another way, customers may have been so sure that 
they were getting a good deal on the car they were buying, that they felt less pressure to 
make sure that they were also getting a good deal on the trade-in car they were selling. If 
the trade-in buyer loss increases enough in conjunction with the EDP, then it could be 
that the net new vehicle price could fall and the final price still rise. If this is the case, 
then we would conclude that the “price cue” effect of EDP is to distract customers from 
the significance of the trade-in buyer loss in contributing to their final price for the car, 
not necessarily to lead customers to a mistaken belief about what has happened to the net 
new vehicle price. 
We investigate how trade-in buyer losses changed following the introduction of the EDP 
promotions by regressing the Trade-In Buyer Loss measure on the manufacturer times 
EDP interaction terms, and on the other control variables:
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Trade-in Buyer Lossijt =  αGM GMj ⋅ EDPt +αFord Fordj ⋅ EDPt +  
    αChrysler Chryslerj ⋅ EDPt + αO Othersj ⋅ EDPt + 
     β1 Xit + β2 Xt + β3 VehicleCostijt + β4 Regionij + φj +ηijt.  (5) 
In Table 14, column 2 we report the α coefficients from this regression using data from 
the time period surrounding the start of the GM EDP promotion. The estimated effects 
are that the trade-in buyer loss increased by $320 for GM cars during this time period, but 
was virtually unchanged for Ford, Chrysler, or the other manufacturers taken together. If 
we look at the set of GM cars for which the final price is estimated to have increased by a 
statistically significant amount (lower panel of Table 14), we see a very similar estimated 
effect: $329. 
                                                 
21 The Trade-in Buyer Loss of a consumer who did not trade in a car is equal to 0 since the customer 
experiences neither a gain nor a loss.    Page 23 
In Table 15, column 2 we report the findings when replicating the analysis for the Ford 
and Chrysler EDP promotions. These estimates indicate that the trade-in buyer loss 
increased by $277 for Ford during this period, and by $433 for Chrysler. GM and the 
other manufacturers taken together have virtually no change in the trade-in buyer loss. If 
we look just at the sample of Ford and Chrysler cars that experience positive and 
significant increases in final price, (lower panel of Table 15), the losses are slightly 
larger: a $337 increase in trade-in buyer loss for Ford, and a $471 increase for Chrysler.  
Our main final price specification has so far been in logs. To more easily compare the 
magnitudes of the trade-in buyer loss with the magnitudes of the final price increase, we 
repeat the specification in equation (5) with Final Price as the dependent variable and 
report the results in column 1 of Table 14 and Table 15. If we look at the set of GM cars 
for which the transaction price is estimated to have increased by a statistically significant 
amount around the GM event, we see an estimated increase in final price of $626. If we 
look just at the sample of Ford and Chrysler cars that experiences positive and significant 
price changes around the Ford/Chrysler event, we find an estimated increase in final price 
of $593 for Ford, and a $650 increase for Chrysler. 
After netting out trade-in buyer losses for the three domestic manufacturers around their 
respective EDP promotions, we find that the increased trade-in buyer loss during the EDP 
promotion cannot fully explain why consumer’s final price increased for many cars under 
the EDP promotion.  
Clearly, the increased buyer loss on the trade-in is only a partial explanation for why 
customers ended up paying higher amounts. We now turn to contract prices and 
consumer rebates. 
5.6.2  Contract Price 
We now look at the contract price, or the price that buyer and dealer agree on as the 
initial price of the car, before trade-ins or customer rebates. We estimate the contract 
price using a specification very similar to equation (5), but substituting the contract price 
for the Trade-in Buyer Loss as the dependent variable: 
Contract Priceijt =   αGM GMj ⋅ EDPt +αFord Fordj ⋅ EDPt +  
    αChrysler Chryslerj ⋅ EDPt +αO Othersj ⋅ EDPt + 
     β1 Xit + β2 Xt  + β3 VehicleCostijt + β4 Regionij + φj +υijt.  (6) 
In Table 14, column 3, we report the α coefficients from this regression. When we use 
data from the time period surrounding the start of the GM EDP promotion, the contract 
price is estimated to have fallen by $881 for GM, but is essentially unchanged over this 
period for Ford, Chrysler, and the other manufacturers. For the sample of GM cars who 
are estimated to have a positive and significant increase in the final price (see the bottom 
panel), the contract price is estimated to have fallen by a very similar amount as in the 
full sample: $888. 
Surrounding the Ford/Chrysler EDP promotions (see Table 15, column 3), the contract 
price for Ford appears to have fallen by just over $800 for Ford, and by $1,044 for 
Chrysler. The contract price does not change for GM or the other manufacturers. In the   Page 24 
sample of Ford and Chrysler models for which there was a positive and significant 
increase in the final price, the contract prices are estimated to fall by slightly larger 
amounts: $875 for Ford and $1,123 for Chrysler. 
We conclude that the prices customers negotiated after the introduction of the EDP 
promotions were in fact much lower than during the pre-promotion period. Given that the 
net new vehicle price component (contract price – direct-to-consumer rebates) of the final 
price increased under EDP, this implies that direct-to-consumer rebates must have fallen 
by even more than the contract prices. We confirm this in the next section. 
5.6.3  Direct-to-Consumer Rebates 
When the EDP promotions took effect, customer rebates were greatly reduced. The dollar 
value of rebates had been increasing steadily since 2001, reaching averages as high as 
$3,000-4,000 per car for some of the American manufacturers in recent years.  To 
investigate what happened to customer rebates following the introduction of the EDP 
promotions, we re-estimated equation (5) using the Customer Rebate as the dependent 
variable.
22 
Customer Rebateijt = αGM GMj ⋅ EDPt +αFord Fordj ⋅ EDPt +  
    αChrysler Chryslerj ⋅ EDPt +αO Othersj ⋅ EDPt + 
     + β1 Xit + β2 Xt  + β3 VehicleCostijt + β4 Regionij + φj +νijt.  (6) 
The results of this regression are reported in column 4 of Table 14 and Table 15. The 
findings indicate that for GM during the GM EDP period, customer rebates fell by about 
$900 on average. During the same period they rose by about $300 for Ford and fell by 
$131 for Chrysler. For GM cars with positive and significant price increases, customer 
cash fell by $1,186.  
During the Ford/Chrysler EDP promotions, customer rebates fell by almost $500 for Ford 
and by $1,189 for Chrysler. During this same period, there was very little change in 
GM’s or other manufacturers’ customer rebate amounts. For the Ford and Chrysler cars 
with positive and significant price increases, customer cash fell by $1,131 for Ford and 
by $1,302 for Chrysler. 
While the change in trade-in buyer loss was not very different in the full sample and in 
the sample of models with positive and significant price increases, the change in 
customer rebate amounts has a greater difference between the samples, most dramatically 
for Ford around the Ford/Chrysler EDP promotion. This suggests that the decrease in 
customer rebates may be an important determinant of whether a model is included in the 
“positive and significant” sample or not. 
We can conclude that on average the increase in final prices was attributable to increases 
in trade-in buyer losses, and to customer rebates falling by more than the EDP-induced 
decreases in contract price. 
                                                 
22 The Consumer Rebate of a transaction for which there was no rebate offered by the manufacturer is equal 
to 0.    Page 25 
5.6.4  Excluding Trade-Ins 
In the previous sections, we have examined the effect of the EDP promotions on the final 
price by looking separately at the trade-in buyer loss and the net new vehicle price 
(contract price minus customer rebate). While we believe that the trade-in buyer loss 
should be included in the final price measure in order for final price to measure 
customers’ actual wealth outlay for the car, trade-in transactions do introduce 
complications. While we find it an interesting question how the EDP offer for the new car 
price affects the negotiation over the trade in, we also recognize that if the EDP 
promotion affects the trade-in negotiation, that complicates how we interpret the 
comparative static of what the effect of the EDP is on price. 
In light of this, we repeat our analysis of the effect of EDP on the price components by 
looking at the subsample of transactions that do not involve trade-ins. In this subsample, 
we can avoid the question of how the EDP promotion offer affects customers’ negotiation 
behavior. In fact, it is a slight majority of transactions (about 55%) that do not use trade-
ins.   
These results are reported in Tables 16 and 17. We focus on the results for the samples of 
cars with positive and significant price changes. For the full sample of GM transactions 
around the GM event, Table 14 showed that the average increase in final price is $626, of 
which $298 was an increase in net new vehicle price (the change in the contract price 
minus the change in customer cash). In Table 16, we see that when we restrict this sample 
to transactions that did not involve trade-ins (for which the trade-in buyer loss is perforce 
zero), the net new vehicle price increases by $693. For Ford and Chrysler, the full sample 
results show and increase of $256 and $179 in the net new vehicle price for Ford and 
Chrysler respectively, while restricting the sample to transactions that did not involve 
trade-ins yields estimated increases in net new vehicle prices of $366 and $398 
respectively. 
There are multiple possible explanations for these differences. We note that the change in 
customer cash is different between the “full” and “no trade-in” samples (a bigger 
decrease in customer cash in the no trade-in sample for GM, but a smaller decrease for 
Ford and Chrysler), which suggests that the mix of cars is not the same in the two 
samples. We have noted above that dealers are willing to shift profits between the trade-
in and new car transactions, and the results may indicate that dealers were less willing to 
agree to a discount from the EDP price for customers not using trade-ins (and therefore 
not providing the dealer an opportunity to make back his concession on the new car via 
profits on the trade-in). The results may also be explained by differences in customer 
types between those who use and do not use trade-ins. We have not yet devised a way to 
distinguish among these explanations. For now, we draw a more modest conclusion, 
which is that these results argue that the increase in final price measured in the previous 
subsections does not appear to be some perverse effect of how we have calculated or 
incorporated the trade-in buyer loss. Even in transactions that do not use trade-ins, final 
prices for a subset of cars increase at the advent of the EDP.   Page 26 
5.6.5  Financing Costs 
In the previous several subsections, we have considered the final price, defined as 
contract price minus manufacturer rebate plus trade-in buyer loss, as the customer’s total 
wealth outlay for the car. In doing so, we have not taken into account that for customers 
who borrow money in order to pay for their new car, the total wealth outlay over time 
will also depend on the interest rate of that loan. In this subsection, we investigated 
whether three different aspects of financing changed at the time of the EDP promotions in 
a way that would influence our interpretation of how the EDP promotions affected 
customers’ total wealth outlays for their cars.  
The three aspects of financing that we examined were the annual percentage rates offered 
for new car purchases (the “loan APR”) and for new car leases (the “lease APR”) by the 
captive lending arms of the Big 3 manufacturers, and the residual values offered for 
leased cars. The higher the loan or lease APR, the more the customer will pay over time 
in order to own a new vehicle obtained for a given final price. Thus, lowering APRs 
would be one way the manufacturers could counteract the higher final prices we found to 
be associated with the advent of the EDP promotions. In unreported regressions, we find 
no evidence that manufacturers lowered APRs at the time of the EDP promotions. The 
GM loan APR rose by 0.6 percentage points (p-value 0.000) and the lease APR by 0.1 
percentage point (p-value 0.003) at the time of the GM EDP, while Ford and Chrysler’s 
loan APRs rose by 0.8 and 1.8 percentage points (p-values 0.000) respectively at the start 
of the Ford and Chrysler EDP promotions. The lease APR rose by 1 percentage point (p-
value 0.000) for Ford but fell by 0.5 percentage point (p-value 0.000) for Chrysler at the 
advent of their EDP promotions.
23 While our estimates are based on the APRs offered by 
captive lending arms of the Big 3 manufacturers, the EDP promotions occurred in the 
middle of a period in which interest rates in general were steadily rising. For example, the 
prime rate had risen monotonically from 4% in January 2004 to 6% in early May 2005. It 
stayed at 6% through the end of June (the GM EDP promotion started on June 3, 2005), 
rising to 6.25% the same week as the Ford and Chrysler promotions started, on July 5 and 
6, respectively. 
The third financial component we investigate is the residual value. When a customer 
leases a car, he or she negotiates a purchase price with the dealer. The difference between 
that purchase price and the residual value of the car is the amount that the customer must 
finance over the lifetime of the lease.
24 The higher the residual value, the less the lessee 
will have to pay per month over the course of the lease. If manufacturers wished to 
counteract an increase in final price, one way to do so would be to increase residual 
values. We find that residual values decreased at the advent of the EDP promotion, 
increasing the amounts customers who leased paid for their cars, similar to the effect on 
                                                 
23 Looking just within the sample of cars with statistically significant estimated price increases, the results 
are similar. GM’s loan APR rises by 0.6 (p-value 0.000) and its lease APR has no statistically significant 
change. Ford and Chrysler’s loan APRs both rise by 1 percentage point (p-values 0.000) while the lease 
APR rises by 0.5 percentage point for Ford and falls by 0.5 percentage point for Chrysler (p-values 0.000). 
24 At the end of the lease period, the customer has the option of returning the car to the dealer, or 
purchasing the car for the residual value.   Page 27 
final price estimated in the previous sections. At the start of the GM EDP promotions, we 
estimate that residual values fell by $170 (p-value 0.008) for GM, while the start of the 
Ford and Chrysler EDP promotions coincided with a decrease in residual values of $1235 
for Ford and $258 for Chrysler.
25 
These results lead us to conclude that the effect of final prices that we estimated in 
previous sections was not counteracted or undone by changes in financing terms. If 
anything, changes in financing terms appear to further increase the wealth outlay of 
customers who bought at the beginning of the EDP promotions relative to those who 
bought just before. 
5.7  Summary 
The findings reported in this section appear to confirm that the introduction of the EDP 
programs resulted in very large short-run increases in sales. 
The findings allow us to rule out two explanations for the findings.  The sales increases 
associated with the EDP promotions cannot be fully explained by reductions in the 
vehicle prices.  For many models customers actually spent more (on an equivalent 
vehicle) after the EDP plans were introduced, and the sales increase extended to these 
models.  The findings also cannot be fully explained by industry-wide demand shocks, 
since we did not observe similar sales changes for manufacturers who did not participate 
in the programs.   
We did find evidence that the EDP programs coincided with customers receiving less for 
their vehicle trade-ins.  However, the net new vehicle price (contract price minus rebates) 
also increased under EDP promotions. While the average contract price decreased 
markedly, direct-to-consumer rebates decreased even more, resulting in consumers 
paying higher prices not just through less favorable trade-ins but also through higher net 
new vehicle prices.  
6  Understanding the role of EDP promotions  
In this section we address the question of why the EDP promotions worked successfully 
to increase short-run sales, despite the evidence that the effective price paid by customers 
increased on many models.  We begin by elaborating on our leading hypothesis, namely 
the price signaling interpretation proposed in the introduction.  We then consider 
alternative explanations for why prices and unit sales may have increased at the same 
time.  In particular, we consider three possibilities.  First, we consider the possibility that 
there was an increase in advertising expenditure following the introduction of the EDP 
promotions.  Second, we investigate whether the increased sales may have been driven by 
customers taking advantage of the opportunity to purchase without needing to engage in 
price negotiations with the dealers.  Finally, we investigate whether there were 
differences in the types of customers who purchased before and after the introduction of 
the EDP programs. 
                                                 
25 If we look only with the sample of cars with statistically significant price increases, we estimate that 
residual values decreased by $76 for GM, by $820 for Ford, and by $257 for Chrysler at the advent of their 
respective EDP promotions.   Page 28 
6.1  Price Cues 
One way to explain how sales could have gone up for cars whose prices also went up 
would be to turn to a behavioral explanation. One could suggest biases in perception, 
schemes to reduce cognitive effort, or other justifications that would lead to non-
optimizing behavior. While we cannot rule out that such factors were at play, in this 
section we argue that we do not need to call upon a behavioral explanation, nor to claim 
that what we are observing is an “out of equilibrium” outcome. Instead, we will argue 
that the findings are consistent with an equilibrium outcome in which the EDP 
promotions act as a “noisy” signal of a temporary price reduction.  
Anderson and Simester (1998) construct a model of a price cue as a noisy signal to 
explain why customers respond to “Sale” signs posted by retailers. They note that the 
apparent effectiveness of sale signs is surprising: they are inexpensive to produce and 
retailers generally make no commitment when using them.  Nevertheless, Anderson and 
Simester show that a sale sign can be a credible signal. The key to their argument is that 
retailers who wish to discount their prices on some items (for example, to eliminate 
unsold inventory), will prefer to put sale signs on items that are truly discounted. Once all 
the truly discounted items are covered, retailers may also choose to put them on some 
undiscounted items. However, the cues are self-regulating, since using too many sales 
signs reduces their credibility and hence their effectiveness. In equilibrium, while all of 
the discounted items have sale signs, only some of the undiscounted items have them. As 
a result, the sale signs are informative but are not fully revealing: an item that has a sale 
sign is more likely to be discounted than one without, but not all items with sale signs are 
discounted. Customers optimally respond to the signal, knowing that it is sometimes not 
true, while firms use the signal selectively in order to preserve the signal’s effectiveness. 
We suggest that similar forces could be at work with the EDP promotions. We believe 
that there are several reasons for customers to have treated the EDP promotions as a 
credible (if noisy) signal of discounted prices. First, this was the first time that these firms 
had offered this promotion.  In Anderson and Simester’s model the credibility of the cue 
is regulated by the frequency of use, and so the novelty of the promotion may have 
enhanced its effectiveness.
26  Second, while we have focused on the subset of cars for 
which final price increased, there was also a subset of cars for which the final price 
decreased. In that sense, as in Anderson and Simester’s model, the signal is accurate for 
some items, misleading for others.  Third, the EDP promotions were not just “cheap 
talk,” in the way that sale signs are in Anderson and Simester’s model. Auto 
manufacturers did have pre-existing employee purchase programs, with prices that were 
lower than posted MSRPs. Had manufacturers not actually offered the employee 
purchase prices, or had they attempted to manipulate the prices upwards in conjunction 
with the EDP promotions, they would presumably have been exposed to potential 
                                                 
26 A corollary is that the cue will be less effective if the firms use it for a second time.  This is consistent 
with anecdotal evidence that Chrysler did not experience the same lift in demand when they repeated the 
promotion in 2006.  However, we recognize that there were several important differences in the manner in 
which the promotion was implemented in 2006, and these may contributed to the diminished effectiveness. 
See also Thompson and Noordewier (1992) on the reduced effectiveness of repeated promotions in the auto 
industry.   Page 29 
lawsuits. Indeed, managers at one of the Big Three manufacturers confirmed that the 
EDP promotions had attracted the attention of several states’ attorneys general, who 
wanted to ensure that the programs were not misleading. Consistent with this 
interpretation, our findings in Tables 14 and 15 confirm that contract prices fell by $800 
or more for all three manufacturers following introduction of the EDP promotion. This 
was the component of price that the EDP purported to lower, and it did so dramatically. 
In this sense, the signal contained in the EDP promotion was indeed accurate. 
Finally, the characteristics of the EDP promotion also lend plausibility to the claim that it 
represents low prices. Customers are familiar with employee discounts from other 
contexts, and there would be little reason to establish such a program if the prices were 
not truly discounted. The promotions were also for a fixed period of time, suggesting that 
the discount was indeed temporary, and not a permanent price reduction. We have also 
described how the summer of 2005 was a period of high inventory levels and financial 
constraint for the Big Three auto manufacturers, both plausible reasons for manufacturers 
to want to offer a temporary price discount.   
6.2  Advertising 
One alternative explanation that might be offered for why sales could increase following 
introduction of the EDP promotions even on cars for which prices had also increased is 
that advertising that coincided with the EDP promotions could have raised buyers’ 
willingness-to-pay. To investigate this possibility we purchased detailed data from TNS 
Media Intelligence describing weekly advertising expenditure in the automobile industry. 
In Table 18, we report the advertising expenditure for GM during the two-week pre-test 
period before the start of the GM EDP promotion, and for the two-week period at the 
beginning of the GM EDP period. We also report the Ford’s and Chrysler’s advertising 
expenditure in the pre-test and post-test periods surrounding the start of the Ford and 
Chrysler promotions. For comparison, we list the advertising expenditures for the same 
calendar period in 2004, the year before the EDP promotions. 
As Table 18 shows, advertising expenditure decreased for all three manufacturers 
between their respective pre-test and post-test periods. For GM, we see that advertising 
expenditure decreased by 21% between the pre-test and post-test periods, similar to the 
17% decline for the same calendar periods in 2004. For Ford, advertising expenditure 
decreased by 2% between the pre-test and post-test periods, compared to a 6% increase 
over the same period the previous year. Finally, Chrysler’s advertising expenditure 
decreased by 24% between the pre-test and post-test periods, compared to a 1% decrease 
the previous year.  
Figure 4 shows the monthly advertising expenditures for 2005 for each of the Big Three 
manufacturers, with the EDP promotion months highlighted. These graphs further 
reinforce the message that the EDP promotions did not coincide with a big increase in 
advertising expenditure. If anything, the EDP months were low advertising months 
compared to the months before and after.   Page 30 
The employee discount promotions were publicized in the press and many potential 
customers seemed to have been aware of them. We suspect that this was accomplished 
despite lower advertising than in the weeks before the promotion started because the 
promotions received press coverage. While this press coverage would have spread the 
message for the Big Three manufacturers without their actually spending advertising 
dollars, we would argue that the press coverage was not free advertising of the brand-
building sort that would generally increase willingness to pay. The information content of 
the press coverage was, as far as we can tell from having examined articles from USA 
Today, The Wall Street Journal, and the New York Times, purely informative in the 
sense that it described the existence and structure of EDP promotions.
28 In addition, 
towards the end of June, the articles started describing the sales success of these 
promotions. We would thus argue that if it was press coverage that helped fuel the 
phenomenon that sales increased even though prices increased, it was not because it 
conveyed a conventional utility-boosting advertising message, but rather because it made 
consumers aware of these promotions.  
6.3  Disutility of Bargaining 
We now discuss a second alternative explanation for the result that under the EDP 
promotion, sales increased even for cars whose prices increased. We know from 
Zettelmeyer, Scott Morton, and Silva-Risso (2006) that many consumers dislike the 
bargaining process usually associated with buying a car. Consumers may thus have been 
taking advantage of the EDP promotion as an opportunity to obtain a car at a relatively 
low price (meaning higher than the price that could normally be obtained by haggling, 
but lower than the price one would normally obtain without haggling) without having to 
undergo an unpleasant negotiation in order to get that low price.  
One indication that the perceived no-haggle feature of the EDP was attractive to 
customers is suggested by the results of the Ford customer survey that we briefly 
discussed in the introduction.  When customers were asked the most important reasons 
for purchasing a vehicle under the employee pricing promotion, “best pricing ever 
available to a customer” was cited by 67% of respondents.  In addition, 31% of 
respondents cited “no need to negotiate price.”  Notice that the “no-haggle” explanation 
and the “price cue” explanation are not mutually exclusive—both could be operating at 
the same time.  
If there was less price haggling as a result of the EDP promotions, we would expect to 
see the variance of prices decrease when the EDP takes effect. Because there are so many 
car models and configurations of those models, it is difficult to make a pre vs. post 
comparison on the basis of final prices, particularly since the mix of models or 
configurations could have changed between the pre-EDP and EDP periods. We can get 
some idea of whether the variance of prices has changed, however, by regressing prices 
on car fixed effects, geographic regions, and vehicle cost (to control for unobserved 
options) and then analyzing the variance of the residuals. We find in unreported results 
                                                 
28 We did not find coverage that unequivocally stated that the EDP prices were very attractive prices 
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that the variance of residuals falls between the pre-EDP and EDP periods, with the largest 
and most statistically significant decrease for GM at the time of the GM EDP promotion, 
and for Ford and Chrysler at the time of the Ford and Chrysler EDP promotions. The 
reduction in variance suggests that the EDP promotions may indeed have led to 
customers haggling less than they did before the EDP, which may in turn contribute to 
the increase in sales that we see despite an increase in average prices. 
We can examine whether the “no-haggle” aspect of EDP could alone explain the 
observed sales increase by analyzing prices and sales at “no-haggle” dealerships. There 
are two such categories of dealership. One category is Saturn dealerships. Saturn is a 
nameplate of GM, and its business model dictates that all Saturn dealerships are “no-
haggle.” The second category is a major publicly traded national chain (NC) owning 
about 300 dealerships of many different nameplates. This chain has an explicit policy of 
not haggling. For sales at dealerships belonging to NC and also at Saturn dealerships, any 
difference in final prices and sales between the pre and post EDP periods cannot be 
attributed to a change from “haggle” to “no-haggle” pricing—transactions were “no 
haggle” both before and after the EDP.  
We repeat the analysis, now within “no-haggle” dealerships, of identifying cars that 
experienced positive and significant price changes and then measuring whether sales of 
those cars increased. If sales of most such cars increased within the subset of “no haggle” 
dealerships, then it suggests that the empirical finding that sales increase for cars whose 
prices increase is not attributable to EDP introducing a “no haggle” aspect to 
negotiations. 
Table 19 shows that 28.6% of GM models had positive and significant price changes at 
“no haggle” dealerships around GM’s introduction of the EDP promotion. In contrast, at 
non-GM dealerships owned by NC, only 2.9% of models had positive and significant 
price changes. Table 20 shows that 30% of Ford models and 26.7% of Chrysler models 
had positive and significant price changes at the start of the Ford and Chrysler EDP 
promotions. In contrast, at non-Ford/Chrysler dealerships owned by NC, only 2.9% of 
models had positive and significant price changes. 
Table 21 examines the sales changes around the GM EDP promotion. Of the 8 GM 
models whose prices increased at no-haggle dealerships, 7 of those models had increased 
sales at these dealerships. Both a sign test and a signed rank test reject that sales 
decreases are as likely as or more likely than increases for GM. Table 22 presents the 
same analysis for the Ford/Chrysler EDP. For Ford, there are 6 models with positive and 
significant price changes at no-haggle dealerships, and 5 of those models experience sales 
increases. A signed rank test rejects that sales decreases are as likely as or more likely 
than sales increases for these models (because of the small sample size, the sign test 
rejects only at a p-value of 0.11). For Chrysler, there are 4 models with significant price 
increases, all of which experience sales decreases. 
Overall, the conclusion is that the EDP led to a lower fraction of models with positive 
and significant price changes at no-haggle dealerships than at regular dealerships. 
However, for those GM and Ford cars whose prices increased, sales tended to also 
increase. Finding this result in the no-haggle dealerships—which had no-haggle policies 
both before and after the introduction of EDP—suggests that the positive association   Page 32 
between price and sales cannot be solely the result of customers’ valuing the EDP 
promotion because of its no-haggle aspect. 
6.4  Customer Differences 
If the EDP promotions had greater appeal to some types of customers than others, we 
might expect that we would see differences in the characteristics of the customers who 
purchased before and after the introduction of the EDP promotions.  Notice that this 
explanation is perhaps best interpreted as a complement to the price cue and no-haggle 
interpretations, rather than as an alternative explanation.  If the price cue prompted 
purchases by customers who would not have otherwise purchased, it seems plausible 
(indeed likely) that these incremental customers were more price sensitive than customers 
who would have purchased even without the EDP promotion.  Similarly, the no-haggle 
interpretation anticipates an increase in the proportion of customers who do not like to 
negotiate.  It would be surprising if there were no differences in the characteristics of 
customers who like to negotiate and those who are averse to it. 
To investigate whether there are differences in the types of customers who purchased 
before and after the introduction of the EDP promotions, we compared the characteristics 
of the customers on both demographic measures, and the types of vehicles (if any) that 
they traded in. To look at demographic measures, we regressed each demographic 
measure on our EDP indicator variable and car fixed effects in order to estimate how 
customers who bought a given car during the EDP promotions differed from those who 
bought the same car just prior to the EDP period. The regressions were run separately for 
each of the Big 3 manufacturers. Tables 23-25 report the estimated coefficients. There 
are, for each of the manufacturers, a number of demographic measures that vary 
statistically significantly between the pre- and post-EDP samples; across the three 
manufacturers, the most common differences are in age, commute time, median 
household size, and vehicles per household. Although these differences are statistically 
significant, the sizes of the differences are small, in most cases, a difference of around 
1% relative to the mean value of the demographic variable. For example, the largest 
effects relative to mean values is for the Ford cars in the percent black (which decreases 
by 0.6 percentage points relative to a mean of 8% at the start of the EDP promotion) and 
the percent Asian (which decreases by 0.2 percentage points relative to a mean of 3% at 
the start of the EDP promotion.) It does not seem possible that differences of this size 
could be responsible for the 30-40% increases in unit sales that coincided with the EDP 
promotions.
29  
We also investigated whether EDP buyers are more likely to use trade-ins than non-EDP 
buyers. In unreported results, we find that customers who buy a GM car during the GM 
EDP are more likely by 3.6 percentage points to use a trade-in (compared to customers 
who buy a GM car in the weeks just previous to the EDP promotion, 51% of whom use a 
                                                 
29 The small sizes of these changes also indicates that customers who are usually disadvantaged in 
traditional price negotiations, such as women and blacks (Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso, 
2003), are not attracted to buying in much greater numbers under the EDP promotions than are other 
customers. This is a further piece of suggestive evidence that avoiding disutility of bargaining is not the 
primary appeal of the EDP promotions.   Page 33 
trade-in.) For Ford, the fraction of buyers using a trade-in increases by 1.7 percentage 
points at the start of the EDP, while the fraction of Chrysler buyers using trade-ins falls 
by 8.3 percentage points.  
A more interesting piece of information is what happens to the value of the cars that 
customers trade in. We regressed the trade-in value, as booked by the dealer, on the EDP 
indicator, on the mileage of the traded-in car, and on fixed effects for the traded-in car 
including make, model, model year, trim level, cylinders, doors, and the decile of mileage 
into which the car fell to account for mileage having a differential effect on trade-in value 
across cars. What we found was that dealers booked the value of a given car (as defined 
by the fixed effects) by about $200-300 less at the beginning of the EDP promotion than 
they had in the weeks just prior to the start of the promotion. This may indicate that 
dealers respond to the increased volume of transactions, and therefore the increased 
supply of trade-ins arising from those transactions, by reducing the booked value of a 
given trade-in vehicle. This result is interesting because, as we have shown above, 
customers are receiving less for their trade-ins relative to the booked value of the trade-
ins at the start of the EDP. If the booked values fall at the start of the EDP, this amplifies 
the amount that customers lose on their trade-in relative to what they would have 
received had they bought in the weeks just before the start of the EDP. 
When we regress the trade in value on the EDP post-test indicator and fixed effects for 
the new vehicle, we find that the trade-in values fall by $700-800 at the start of the EDP. 
If $200-300 of this is a decrease in the value that dealers are assigning to any given car on 
average, then this suggests that for any given new car purchased, the trade-ins that 
customers are bringing in exchange for that car are worth about $500 less than the cars 
that they brought in to purchase the same car before the EDP took effect. We think that 
this is suggestive of a trading up effect: The difference between the value of the new car 
that customers are buying under the EDP and the value of the trade-in car they are 
bringing is $500 larger than that difference before the EDP. While we do not wish to 
endow this finding with more significance than it warrants, we believe that it is consistent 
with the hypothesis that customers thought that the EDP was giving them such good 
prices that they could afford to buy a more expensive car. 
6.5  Expectation of price increases 
We have interpreted our primary finding—that sales went up for some of the cars whose 
prices went up in conjunction with the EDP promotion—as evidence that consumers 
responded to the EDP promotion as a signal that prices were temporarily discounted. An 
alternative interpretation would be that customers realized that prices had increased in 
conjunction with the promotion, and interpreted the promotion as a signal that prices 
would increase still further in the future. If this were the case, then customers might wish 
to purchase more during the EDP promotion than they had in the period just prior even 
knowing that prices had increased, as a way of avoiding still higher prices in the future. 
We think that there are several reasons that this is a less likely explanation. First, the 
advertising message that accompanied the promotion does not appear designed to 
communicate that prices have increased and will increase further. One tagline associated 
with the Ford Family Pricing promotions proclaims “You get the best prices of the year. 
Period.”, which seems to imply looking backwards as well as forwards.   Page 34 
Second, the time path of prices over the model year is generally to fall. This is 
particularly true because customers know that a new model will be introduced every year 
during the late summer or early fall. Even if the new model incorporates trivial changes, 
the model year matters for the resale value, even conditioning on mileage. If 
manufacturers wished to convey to customers that they expected this general pattern not 
to hold in 2005, making employee prices available to everyone (and then extending the 
promotions through September) seems to us a rather obtuse way to do so. 
7  Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have investigated the effect of the employee discount pricing 
promotions offered by the Big 3 U.S. manufacturers on prices and sales. We find that 
prices for about 40% of models actually increased in conjunction with the promotion. For 
a majority of models within this subset of vehicles, sales actually increased. We 
investigate a variety of explanations for this phenomenon. Our evidence indicates that 
this was not the result of increased advertising, decreased financing costs, or an overall 
auto industry trend of rising sales. Our leading hypothesis is that the EDP promotions 
functioned as a price cue, signaling to customers that prices were temporarily discounted. 
Because features of the auto industry make it difficult for customers to be fully informed 
about prices, customers responded to the price cue by increasing their purchases, even or 
models for which prices went up. We also consider whether the perceived “no haggle” 
aspect of the EDP promotions can explain the effect. While we cannot rule out that this 
played a role, it does not appear to be the entire story. 
In decomposing the final price of a car into its components, we find that the price 
increases that occurred at the time of the EDP were caused partly by increases in the 
trade-in buyer loss (customers getting paid less for their trade-ins relative to the value of 
those trade-ins than before the EDP promotion) and partly by the fact that decreases in 
direct-to-customer rebates were greater than the EDP discounts to the contract price. 
We conclude that customers can be influenced by price cues, even in a market for an 
expensive purchase, where the gain to having accurate price information is high and 
where customers expend effort searching for that information. The characteristics of 
pricing in the car industry—that prices are negotiated, that they are made up of multiple 
components, that they change unpredictably—make the search for price information by 
customers less than fully revealing. If it is true that price cues—not just prices 
themselves—are an important determinant of customer response, then they should play 
an important role in the promotional strategies of many firms.   Page 35 
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Figure 2: Price and Sales Changes Around the GM Event 
 
 
Figure 3: Price and Sales Changes Around the Ford/Chrysler Event   Page 41 
Figure 4: Percent Change in Monthly Advertising Expenditures, 2004 to 2005 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable   Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Contract Price   28,214  10,182  7,500  163,690 
Customer Cash   1,462  1,614  0  10,000 
Trade Buyer Loss   -410  1,581  -18,500  12,550 
Final Price   26,342  10,134  6,731  163,690 
GM   0.24  0.43  0  1 
Ford   0.14  0.35  0  1 
Chrysler   0.09  0.28  0  1 
Female   0.33  0.47  0  1 
Age   45.52  14.53  16  105 
% Black   0.09  0.14  0  0.99 
% Asian   0.04  0.07  0  0.67 
% Hispanic   0.13  0.18  0  1 
% Less High School   0.16  0.11  0  1 
% College   0.36  0.16  0  0.96 
% Professional Occup.   0.22  0.07  0  0.75 
% Health Support Occup.   0.02  0.01  0  0.27 
% Protective Occup.   0.02  0.01  0  0.77 
% Food Occup.   0.04  0.02  0  0.46 
% Maintenance Occup.   0.03  0.02  0  1 
% Housework Occup.   0.03  0.01  0  1 
% Sales Occup.   0.12  0.03  0  1 
% Administrative Occup.   0.16  0.03  0  0.56 
% Repair Occup.   0.04  0.02  0  0.65 
% Construction Occup.   0.05  0.03  0  1 
% Production Occup.   0.07  0.05  0  0.53 
% Transportation Occup.   0.05  0.03  0  1 
Income   53,130  19,130  4,444  200,001 
Household Size   2.68  0.4  1  8.49 
House Value   161,152  102,025  0  1,000,001 
Vehicles / Household   1.78  0.3  0  4 
% Own House   0.70  0.17  0  1 
% Vacant   0.07  0.07  0  0.89 
Commute Time   27.29  5.60  3.04  123.5 
% Unemployed   0.05  0.03  0  0.83 
% Bad English   0.05  0.07  0  0.69 
% Poverty   0.09  0.07  0  0.86 
Sale on Weekend   0.24  0.43  0  1 
Model Month 5-13   0.73  0.44  0  1 
Model Month 14+   0.22  0.42  0  1 
Vehicle Cost   26,699  9,572  6,370  143,274 
Sample Size  290,910       
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Table 2: Hedonic Price Regressions  
2-Week Windows* 
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Observations  129,284  161,076 
Adj. R-squared  0.969  0.972 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Occupational demographics, car, and 
region fixed effects are unreported. 
** significant at 1 % 
* significant at 5 %;  
+ significant at 10%.    Page 45 




Significant  Positive 
GM  38.6%
  73.9% 
Chrysler  15.2%  63.6% 
Ford  11.1%  40.0% 
Non-domestic models  6.4%  47.8% 
Totals     
Without GM  8.2%  48.4% 
Including GM  15.4%  54.5% 
Test statistic (GM vs. rest)  6.90
**  4.19
** 
Sample size  369  369 
 




Significant  Positive 
GM  13.8%  48.9% 
Ford  23.4%  40.4% 
Chrysler  67.7%  80.6% 
Non-domestic models  5.9%  45.0% 
Totals     
Excluding Ford & Chrysler  8.4%  46.3% 
Including Ford & Chrysler  15.2%  48.4% 
Ford test statistic         2.65
*        (0.75) 
Chrysler test statistic         8.74
**         3.64
**  
Sample size  374  374 
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Table 5: Models with Sales Increases 
Amongst Models with Price Increases 
 
Unweighted 




GM Event       
GM  76.5%
  88.6%
  34 
Chrysler  0.0%  0.0%  6 
Ford  20.0%  29.2%  5 
Non-domestic models  0.0%  0.0%  13 
Total without GM  4.2%  1.0%   
Total with GM  46.6%  53.3%   
Test statistic (GM vs. rest)  7.63
**  12.67
**   
 
Ford & Chrysler Events 
     
GM  0.0%  0.0%
  12 
Chrysler  52.6%  41.8%  19 
Ford  36.4%  50.0%  11 
Non-domestic models  16.7%  9.6%  12 
 
Totals   
   
Excluding Ford & Chrysler  8.3%  3.2%   
Including Ford & Chrysler  29.6%  22.8%   
Ford test statistic (t,1)         2.11
*  3.96
**   
Chrysler test statistic (t,1)        3.60
**        3.59
**   
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Decreased  Total  p-value  p-value 
General Motors   26  0  8  34  0.001  0.002 
Ford  1  0  4  5  0.969  0.931 
Chrysler  0  0  6  6  1.000  0.986 
Hyundai  0  0  1  1  1.000  0.841 
Nissan  0  0  4  4  1.000  0.966 
Toyota  0  0  2  2  1.000  0.910 
* Honda, Nissan, and Volkswagen had no models with statistically significant price increases. 
 
 












Decreased  Total  p-value  p-value 
Chrysler  10  0  9  19  0.500  0.389 
Ford  4  0  7  11  0.887  0.535 
General Motors  0  0  12  12  1.000  0.999 
Hyundai  0  0  1  1  1.000  0.841 
Toyota  1  0  3  4  0.938  0.642 
* Honda, Nissan, and Volkswagen had no models with statistically significant price increases.   Page 48 
Table 7: Daily Industry Sales Around the Ford/Chrysler Event 
Pre-Introduction 
Period 
Industry Sales  Post-Introduction 
Period 
Industry Sales 
18 June 2005  9,297  9 July 2005  9,337 
19 June 2005  2,258  10 July 2005  2,678 
20 June 2005  8,474  11 July 2005  7,111 
21 June 2005  7,386  12 July 2005  6,289 
22 June 2005  7,617  13 July 2005  6,554 
23 June 2005  7,444  14 July 2005  6,925 
24 June 2005  8,761  15 July 2005  7,881 
25 June 2005  10,735  16 July 2005  10,434 
26 June 2005  3,276  17 July 2005  2,795 
27 June 2005  10,475  18 July 2005  8,244 
28 June 2005  9,732  19 July 2005  6,942 
29 June 2005  11,198  20 July 2005  7,127 
30 June 2005  17,245  21 July 2005  7,169 
1 July 2005  9,640  22 July 2005  8,204 
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Table 8: Change in Sales Relative to the Segment 
Ford/Chrysler Event 
 
Models For Which Prices 
Increased 






Decreased  Total  p-value  p-value 
Chrysler  16  3  19  0.002  0.012 
Ford  11  0  11  0.000  0.002 





Table 9: Change in Sales Relative to the Segment 
GM Event 
 
Models For Which Prices 






Decreased  Total  p-value  p-value 
General Motors  28  6  34  0.000  0.000 
Chrysler  0  6  6  1.000  0.986 
Ford  1  4  5  0.969  0.960 
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Table 10: Estimated Price Changes  
GM Event, 1-Week Windows 
 
Positive & 
Significant  Positive 
GM  36.4%
  72.7% 
Chrysler  12.9%  61.3% 
Ford  12.8%  41.0% 
Other models  6.7%  57.1% 
Totals     
Without GM  8.6%  54.9% 
Including GM  15.5%  59.4% 
Test statistic (GM vs. rest)  5.84
**  2.76
* 
Sample size  310  310 
 
 
Table 11: Estimated Price Changes 





GM  12.2%  59.8% 
Ford  29.3%  51.2% 
Chrysler  68.0%  84.0% 
Other models  5.9%  45.0% 
Totals     
Excluding Ford & Chrysler  8.6%  50.0% 
Including Ford & Chrysler  15.8%  52.8% 
Ford test statistic         3.37
**        (0.15) 
Chrysler test statistic         7.77
**         3.25
**  
Sample size  322  322 
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Table 12: Change in Sales Relative to the Segment 
GM Event, 1-Week Windows 
 
Models For Which Prices 






Decreased  Total  p-value  p-value 
General Motors  20  7  27  0.010  0.001 
Chrysler  0  4  4  1.000  0.966 
Ford  1  4  5  0.969  0.931 
 
 
Table 13: Change in Sales Relative to the Segment 
Ford/Chrysler Event, 1-Week Windows 
 
Models For Which Prices 
Increased 






Decreased  Total  p-value  p-value 
Chrysler  13  2  15  0.004  0.003 
Ford  11  1  12  0.003  0.002 
General Motors  0  10  10  1.000  0.997   Page 52 
 
Table 14: Estimates of Price Components Around the GM Event 
































































Robust SE in parentheses 
** significantly different from zero, p<0.01 
* significantly different from zero, p<0.05 
+ significantly different from zero, p<0.10 
      Page 53 
 
Table 15: Estimates of Price Components Around the Ford & Chrysler Events 






Full Sample         
 









































































Robust SE in parentheses 
** significantly different from zero, p<0.01 
* significantly different from zero, p<0.05 
+ significantly different from zero, p<0.10 
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Table 16: Estimates of Price Components Around the GM Event 
No Trade-In Sample 






Full Sample          
GM*EDP  345
** 




















Others*EDP  -6 




Observations  65,343    65,343  65,343 
 










Observations  6,359    6,359  6,359 
Robust SE in parentheses 
** significantly different from zero, p<0.01 
* significantly different from zero, p<0.05 
+ significantly different from zero, p<0.10 
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Table 17: Estimates of Price Components Around the Ford & Chrysler Events 
No Trade-In sample: 






Full Sample          
GM*EDP  22 






Ford*EDP  30 





















Sample size  79,580    79,580  79,580 
 


















Sample size  6,359    6,359  6,359 
Robust SE in parentheses 
** significantly different from zero, p<0.01 
* significantly different from zero, p<0.05 
+ significantly different from zero, p<0.10 
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Table 18: Advertising Expenditure  
Before and After the EDP Introduction 
  2005  2004 
GM Spending Around the 
Ford GM 
   
Pre-introduction   $145,568,700  $115,046,400 
Post-introduction
  $114,307,600  $  95,328,300 
Difference  -21%  -17% 
Ford Spending Around the 
Ford Event     
Pre-introduction   $  49,057,300  $  55,714,500 
Post-introduction
  $  48,005,100  $  58,871,900 
Difference  -2%  6% 
Chrysler Spending Around the 
Chrysler Event 
   
Pre-introduction   $  55,937,300  $  42,323,900 
Post-introduction
  $  42,635,300  $  42,091,200 
Difference  -24%  -1% 
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Chrysler  0% 
Ford  6.7% 
Other models  2.7% 
Totals   
Without GM  2.9% 
Including GM  8.3% 
Test statistic (GM vs. rest) 
** 
Sample size  133 
 
 





GM  6.5% 
Ford  30.0% 
Chrysler  26.7% 
Other models  1.4% 
Totals   
Excluding Ford & Chrysler  2.9% 
Including Ford & Chrysler  9.4% 
Ford test statistic         
** 
Chrysler test statistic         
** 
Sample size  138 
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Table 21: Change in Sales Relative to the Segment Around the GM Event 
No-Haggle Dealers 
 
Models For Which Prices 






Decreased  Total  p-value  p-value 
General Motors  7  1  8  0.035  0.013 
Chrysler  0  1  1  1.000  0.841 
Ford      0     
 
 
Table 22: Change in Sales Relative to the Segment Around the Ford/Chrysler Event 
No-Haggle Dealers 
 
Models For Which Prices 
Increased 






Decreased  Total  p-value  p-value 
Chrysler  0  4  4  1  0.966 
Ford  5  1  6  0.109  0.023 
General Motors  0  2  2  1  0.91 
 
 
Table 23: Demographic Differences Pre- and Post-EDP 










Age  -0.64  0.15  46.3  -0.014 
Commute time  -0.21  0.06  26.8  -0.007 
Percent poor English  -0.0021  0.0006  0.04  -0.053 
Median house value  -2,647  817  141,585  -0.019 
Percent Asian  -0.0016  0.0005  0.03  -0.050 
Percent employed in sales  -0.0007  0.0003  0.12  -0.006 
Median household size  -0.0095  0.0037  2.7  -0.004 
Percent Hispanic  -0.0041  0.0017  0.12  -0.035 
Percent employed in transportation  0.0007  0.0003  0.06  0.011 
Vehicles per household  0.0066  0.0030  1.8  0.004 
  * Only statistically significant coefficients reported 
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Table 24: Demographic Differences Pre- and Post-EDP 










Percent black  -0.0061  0.0015  0.08  -0.076 
Percent Asian  -0.0019  0.0005  0.03  -0.064 
Percent Hispanic  -0.0051  0.0018  0.12  -0.044 
Percent poor English  -0.0017  0.0007  0.04  -0.046 
Percent employed in administration  -0.0009  0.0004  0.16  -0.006 
Vehicles per household  0.0074  0.0030  1.81  0.004 
Age  -0.40  0.17  47.0  -0.008 
Commute time  -0.15  0.06  26.6  -0.006 
Percent employed in repair  0.0004  0.0002  0.04  0.010 
Median household size  -0.0081  0.0040  2.7  -0.003 
  * Only statistically significant coefficients reported 
 
Table 25: Demographic Differences Pre- and Post-EDP 










Commute time  -0.37  0.08  26.9  -0.014 
Median household size  -0.0217  0.0052  2.6  -0.008 
Vehicles per household  -0.0108  0.0041  1.8  -0.006 
Percent home ownership  -0.0056  0.0022  0.72  -0.008 
Income  -596  262  52,333  -0.011 
Age  0.42  0.21  45.9  0.009 
Percent employed in construction  -0.0008  0.0004  0.06  -0.014 
  * Only statistically significant coefficients reported 
 
 